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ABSTRACT 
This report presents first-hand observations of the impacts of the 2006 eruptions of Merapi 
volcano, in central Java, on agriculture and infrastructure of the Yogyakarta region. A field 
team visited the region during the period 22 June – 5 July 2006, representing the University 
of Canterbury’s Natural Hazards Research Centre, GNS Science, the New Zealand 
Earthquake Commission and the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management. In addition to coverage of agricultural and infrastructural impacts, this report 
also includes a description of the volcanology of the 2006 eruptions, and a discussion of the 
Indonesian response to the volcanic crisis including evacuation and crisis management. 
 
Agriculture received the most damage of any economic sector, mostly due to the close 
proximity of a significant number of farms to Merapi volcano. Impacts on crops varied with 
ash thickness, as well as by crop type and plant maturity. Up to 100% of crops were lost in 
some locations. Significant weight loss in cows was observed, due to animals eating tephra-
covered fodder.  
 
Overall, impacts to infrastructure were slight. Lifeline utilities and other infrastructure 
exhibited a higher degree of resilience than expected, probably due to the absence of rain as 
the eruption occurred during the dry season. Deposits left from the eruption on the upper, 
south-facing slopes of Merapi still pose a severe lahar threat to the floodplains below in times 
of heavy rain.  
 
Despite their relatively small size, the 2006 eruptions of Merapi caused two deaths, the 
destruction of most of the village of Bebeng/Kaliadem, the displacement of tens of thousands 
of people, and significant impacts on the agriculture of the region. We conclude this report by 
attempting to draw lessons for New Zealand from our findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
Merapi volcano 
Indonesia 
2006 eruption 
Agricultural impacts 
Infrastructural impacts 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia (Figure 1) experiences an average of one significant volcanic eruption every 
year (Witham, 2005) because of intense volcanic activity along the Sumatra and Java 
subduction zones which comprise one of the longest, most prolific convergent margins 
on Earth. Merapi volcano, located approximately 25 km north of the city of Yogyakarta in 
central Java (Figure 2), is widely recognized as one of the most frequently active 
volcanoes on Earth (Witham, 2005). In early April 2006, Merapi began to show signs of 
volcanic unrest as volcano-tectonic and volcanic earthquakes increased daily (WHO, 
2006).  Seismic activity continued throughout May, and extrusive activity, in the form of 
lava flows from the summit, was first observed on 4 May, marking the beginning of the 
eruption. 
 
Figure 1 Map of Indonesia, with Merapi indicated by red triangle 
 
Proximal hazards during the eruption were due largely to block and ash (pyroclastic) 
flows resulting from periodic partial collapse of the growing lava dome on the summit of 
Merapi. Distal hazards were due to tephra falls originating from convecting plumes of hot 
gas accompanying both larger block and ash flows and the fracturing summit lava dome. 
Variable winds dispersed tephra widely around Merapi volcano.  
 
This report presents a summary of observations of impacts of this eruption on agriculture 
and infrastructure in the Yogyakarta region of central Java, collected during a field visit 
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Figure 2 Map of Yogyakarta region, south central Java. Merapi is located at top centre 
 
to the region between 22 June and 5 July 2006. Other aspects covered include the 
chronology of the 2006 eruption, evacuation prior to and during the eruption, the local 
response and crisis management, and future hazards from the eruption.  
 
1.1 Rationale for field visit 
The New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) funded the field visit for two of the 
authors (T. Wilson and G. Kaye) to collect observational data on the direct impacts of the 
2006 eruption of Merapi on agriculture and infrastructure around the volcano. An 
important application of this work is to apply the findings in New Zealand, to further our 
predictive capabilities for the impacts of future eruptions in New Zealand. Although many 
projects are currently underway in New Zealand to improve understanding of the impacts 
of volcanic eruptions and other natural hazards on communities, lifelines, agriculture and 
infrastructure (e.g. King et al., 2004; Kaye et al., 2006; Wilson and Kaye, 2007), there is 
little direct observational data because of the small number of eruptions in recent times 
in New Zealand.  
 
The eruption of Merapi also provided an opportunity to advance volcanic hazard risk 
assessment. The Regional Riskscape Project (or Riskscape) is reliant on the concept of 
‘fragility functions’. These are numerical relationships between hazard intensity and 
damage, which need to be validated with existing observations and data. Thus, the 2006 
Merapi eruption provided field observations that will be used to refine fragility functions 
for Riskscape.  
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2. METHODS 
2.1 Field stops and observations 
The team spent five days (23, 25-27 June, 4 July 2006) in the field at Merapi, and 
circumnavigated the volcano. Taking care to visit all sectors of the volcano, 213 field 
stops were made. At each field stop, a GPS waypoint was recorded (Figure 3 and 
Appendix 1). Information recorded in the field included observations of ashfall conditions 
and evidence of physical impacts (Appendix 1). Where appropriate, ash, soil and rock 
samples were collected and brought back to New Zealand for analysis. Photographs and 
video footage were also collected at every location, and matched with GPS points in 
order to facilitate a more detailed review back in New Zealand.  
 
2.2 Interviews with farmers and local residents 
While circumnavigating Merapi, the team interviewed 35 farmers and a further 15 local 
residents with the help of an interpreter.  Efforts were made to obtain a spatially diverse 
sample, although this was hampered by logistical and time constraints. Farmers and 
residents were approached when they were observed working in the fields, in evacuation 
centres, or in villages or hamlets. A set of questions was put to them, covering the 
amount of ashfall they had experienced, any physical damage sustained, damage to 
crops or animals, any economic losses sustained, and the performance of infrastructure 
during the eruption. Occasionally, due to the language barrier, information was received 
on the impacts of past eruptions rather than the current eruption; a distinction was made 
where possible.  
 
2.3 Interviews with agricultural and soil science experts 
In Yogyakarta, discussions were held with local agriculture and soil science experts at 
the Institute of Science and Technology (ISTA) and the University of Gadjah Mada 
(UGM), on 28-29 June 2006. Discussions covered the impacts of ashfall on crops and 
other farming practices, physical damage, economic losses and the performance of 
infrastructure. These experts provided invaluable information about the technical nature 
of farms, crops, seasonality, and agricultural practices around Merapi.  
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Figure 3 Field stops around Merapi showing GPS waypoint numbers 
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3. ERUPTIVE HISTORY AND GEOLOGIC BACKGROUND 
Merapi has a long, active, and varied history. The volcano has been extensively studied, 
and is intensively monitored. Previous studies (e.g. Newhall et al., 2000; Camus et al. 
2000; Voight et al., 2000; Andreastuti et al., 2000) have constrained the historic and 
prehistoric eruption record at Merapi from stratigraphic mapping and age-dating 
investigations. These studies, coupled with observations and monitoring data from the 
last two centuries, suggest that Merapi’s recent behaviour differs from its prehistoric 
activity. 
 
3.1 Prehistoric eruptions 
Stratigraphy and radiocarbon dating of pyroclastic deposits at Merapi volcano have been 
summarised by Newhall et al. (2000), and reveal 10,000 years of explosive eruptions. 
The Holocene record suggests that the mean recurrence period for Volcanic Explosivity 
Index (VEI) 4 events is approximately 100–200 years, and for VEI 5 is approximately 
1000 years. These recurrence periods may be overestimates, as not all tephras or 
pyroclastic flow deposits for events of this size have been recognized (Andreastuti et al., 
2000). 
 
3.2 Historic eruptions 
3.2.1 19th century eruptions 
Tephrostratigraphic evidence (Andreastuti et al. 2000, Voight et al. 2000, Newhall et al. 
2000) suggests that eruptions of Merapi during the 19th century were larger than those of 
the 20th century.  Four eruptions of VEI 3 or greater occurred during the 19th century; the 
largest was a VEI 4 event in 1872 which produced a large crater and generated a 
pyroclastic flow (from column-collapse) that travelled over 20 km from Merapi’s summit. 
Three VEI 3 events occurred in 1822 (possibly 1832), 1846 and 1849. It is possible that 
the 1822 eruption may have been a similar size to the 1872 VEI 4 event. In contrast, 
only two VEI 3 eruptions occurred during the 20th century.  
 
3.2.2 20th century eruptions 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, Merapi volcano has been intensively studied and 
monitored, and detailed records of its eruptive history throughout the 20th century are 
available (Figure 4). As well as showing the distance from the summit and direction of 
observed 20th century pyroclastic flows, this diagram also shows the extent of mapped 
prehistoric flows. It is clear that the pyroclastic flows depicted in Figure 4 are all 
considerably smaller than the flow generated by the 1872 VEI 4 event, which travelled 
20 km. Also, there is a predominance of flows to the westerly quadrant.  
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Figure 4 Prehistoric and 20th century pyroclastic flows from Merapi (adapted from Thouret et al, 2000) 
 
Notable eruptions during the 20th century were the 1930 VEI 3 event, which generated a 
pyroclastic flow that travelled 12 km, caused 1,369 deaths and made approximately 
13,000 people homeless (Table 1). Another VEI 3 event occurred in 1961. It also 
generated a 12 km pyroclastic flow, but was less hazardous, with six people killed and 
approximately 6,000 made homeless. Smaller eruptions have also had devastating 
impacts on local people. For instance, in 1994, a VEI 2 eruption produced 7 km 
pyroclastic flows along the Boyong River, which killed sixty people in the village of 
Turgo. A further 6,026 people were made homeless by or evacuated from this event.  
 
During the 20th century, eruptive activity from Merapi has been characterised 
predominantly by the repeated expulsion of viscous, highly crystalline lavas to form 
bulbous lava domes and thick, stubby lava flows. The gravitational instability and 
collapse of these extrusions tends to generate violent, although modestly-sized, 
pyroclastic flows commonly defined as ‘Merapi-type’ (Voight et al., 2000).  
 
3.2.3 Impacts on human populations 
Since the mid-1500s there have been approximately 7,000 deaths caused by volcanic 
activity at Merapi (Thouret et al., 2000; Witham, 2005), with one of the most lethal 
eruptive episodes in 1930 with 1,369 deaths. On average, a volcanic disaster has 
occurred approximately once every three years (Witham, 2005). Hundreds of villages 
have been destroyed along with thousands of hectares of farmland and forests over the 
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past 300 years (Voight et al., 2000). The effects of eruptions have become increasingly 
more devastating because of the increasing population density around Merapi. Impacts 
on populations around Merapi are illustrated in Table 1 for selected eruptions.  
 
Table 1 Human impact of selected eruptions of Merapi volcano (from Witham, 2005) 
Date of eruption VEI of eruption Number killed Number injured Number 
evacuated or 
made homeless 
1930 3 1,369 - 13,000 
1961 3 6 6 8,000 
1994 2 64 500 6,026 
1998 Effusive - 314 6,000 
Total  
(20th century) 
 1,590 932 32,275 
     
2006 Effusive 2 - 12,000 
 
3.3 Hazard management at Merapi 
There is continued speculation about whether the relatively small eruptions of Merapi 
that have occurred throughout the 20th century and now into the early 21st century herald 
a new era of eruptive style at Merapi. Alternatively, the past century’s activity may be 
low-level background activity that could be interrupted at short notice by much larger 
explosive eruptions (Newhall et al., 2000). Considering Merapi’s 10,000-year record of 
explosive activity (Newhall et al., 2000, Voight et al. 2000), many scientists favour the 
latter hypothesis and have expressed concern that a large eruption will occur in the 
future with only modest or inadequately appreciated precursors.  
 
This debate has important implications for hazard evaluation and management at 
Merapi, particularly in view of the fact that an estimated 440,000 people live in high-risk 
areas around Merapi vulnerable to pyroclastic flows, surges and lahars (Thouret et al., 
2000).  A further complication is that it is typical for eruption locations to change, putting 
different sectors, with populations in varying states of preparedness, at risk. During the 
last 100 years most pyroclastic flows have been to the western quadrant, and to a lesser 
extent, to the north and south of the summit, but the collapse of current or historic domes 
can dramatically change the direction of pyroclastic flows. This was observed during the 
current (2006) eruption, and is discussed further in Section 4.4 below.  
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4. THE 2006 ERUPTION OF MERAPI 
4.1 Chronology 
A chronology of the 2006 eruption of Merapi is provided in Table 2. Locations referred to 
in the table are shown in Figures 6 and 14.  
 
Table 2 Chronology of 2006 eruption of Merapi  
 
 
4.2 Primary physical behaviour and general impacts 
The 2006 Merapi eruption was typical of previous small effusive eruptions from this 
volcano. Fresh, highly-degassed andesitic magma was extruded at the summit into a 
lava dome, which occasionally shed material from its collapsing lower edges down onto 
the upper edifice due to gravitational instability. These collapse events created block and 
ash flows, of which the largest was on 14 June. A block and ash flow travelled 
approximately 4 km down the Woro Valley and devastated the towns of Kaliadem and 
Bebeng. Two men, who tried to escape the flow by sheltering in a bunker, were killed. 
Date Time  Event 
25 April - Merapi Volcano Observatory (BPPTK) reports 198 multi-phase (MPT) 
earthquakes, 4 shallow volcanic tremors (SVT), and one tectonic quake (TT) 
26 April - BPPTK reports 57 MPTs, one SVT 
3 May - BPPTK reports 84 MPTs, one SVT, and 4 discharges 
4 May 02:00 Lava erupted from summit 
7 May - 133 MPTs, 88 TT, and one SVT 
8 May 0:00-06:00 One SVT, 34 MPTs, 29 TTs  
9 May - 6 VTs, 142 MPTs, 152 RFTs. 
10 May 0:00-06:00 One SVT, 123 MPTs, 88 rock fall tremors (RFT), and 4 TTs. Evidence of 
new growing lava dome at summit reported 
12 May - 90 MPTs, 214 RFTs, 4 TTs, 11 pyroclastic flows (PF) max. 1.6 km down 
upper Krasak and Boyong Rivers, lava flows (LF) down same drainages to 
1,500m from summit 
13 May 0:00 and 
06:00 
27 MPTs, 24 RFTs, and 14 PFs of uncertain distance. BPPTK recommends 
communities within 8 km of the crater on the south-southeast sector 
evacuate, along with those within 10 km of the crater on the southwest-west 
side and those within 8 km on the western flank. 
14 May 0:00 to 06:00 23 ash/steam clouds erupted once every 15 minutes 
4/5 June unknown Geger Boyo collapses 
13 June - Alert level lowered from 4 (caution) to 3 (alert) 
14 June ~12:00 Small dome collapse flow causes renewed evacuation of Kaliadem and 
surrounds 
14 June ~15:00 Dome collapse, block and ash flow down Woro valley onto Kaliadem village. 
Two men were killed in a bunker where they tried to escape the flow. Water 
pipes were severed, cutting off water to 12,000 people. The alert level was 
raised to 4 (caution) 
22 June to 5 
July 
- Small dome-collapse block and ash flows continue, but decrease in intensity 
and frequency 
12 July - Alert level lowered from 4 (caution) to 3 (alert). 
12 July to 25th 
August  
 -  Continued decrease in eruption activity 
By October 1  Return to baseline Alert Level 
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Upper Woro Valley 
 
As a result of both the magma extrusion and the collapse-induced flows, fresh juvenile 
lava was fractured at the summit dome and ash was mobilised skyward in convective 
currents from the hot flows, and carried by prevailing winds to fall on communities 
around the volcano. A gas and ash plume trailing to the west-southwest is shown in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 W-SW ash plume from Merapi, viewed from Merapi golf course ~12 km south of the summit 
on 22 June 2006 
 
4.3 Ash deposition (isopach map) 
A range of ash and tephra thicknesses were deposited around Merapi, with greater 
depths found around the valleys on the western, southwestern and southeastern flanks 
of the mountain, where the large block and ash flows travelled. Tephra depths were 
recorded during field visits, and are listed in Appendix 1. Approximate isopach lines have 
been constructed from this data, and are shown in Figure 6. Prevailing winds from the 
west and south also distributed tephra over the eastern and northern sides of the 
mountain. However, most of the surrounding areas experienced only traces of ashfall.  
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Figure 6 Isopach lines for the 2006 Merapi eruptions and inner (8 km radius) and outer (10 km) 
exclusion zones 
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Geger Boyo 
2006 Lava Dome 
4.4 The collapse of the Geger Boyo 
The 1931 lava domes on the southwest flank of Merapi were named ‘Geger Boyo’ 
(crocodile back) by local residents and volcanologists, due to the domes’ resemblance to 
the spine of a crocodile (Figure 7). They were a prominent feature on the upper 
southwest ridge of the volcano, and acted as a protective barrier for communities on the 
southeast side of Merapi by deflecting flows towards the west and southwest. Because 
of the protection offered by the Geger Boyo, communities on the southeast side of 
Merapi had not been subjected to any significant pyroclastic flows since 1930.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 View of the Geger Boyo (outlined) on 11 May 2006 (Dr. S. Bronto, pers. comm.) 
 
 
The Geger Boyo collapsed between 4 and 5 June 2006, cascaded down the Woro valley 
and opened up the southeastern flanks of Merapi to the unstable and growing lava dome 
at the south summit of the volcano (Figures 8-9). This shift in hazard location was 
immediately publicised by the Merapi Volcano Observatory (known locally as the 
BPPTK), and featured prominently in the local newspapers (Dr. S. Bronto, pers. comm.). 
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Figure 8 Southeast flank of Merapi on 5 June 2006, showing the Upper Woro valley, the collapsed 
Geger Boyo and the growing lava dome at the summit (Dr. S. Bronto, pers. comm.) 
 
 
Figure 9 View of the southeast flank of Merapi on 14 June 2006 showing deeply-eroded Woro Valley. 
The lava dome is partially obscured by steam and ash (Dr S. Bronto, pers. comm.) 
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4.5 Block and ash flows on 14 June 
At approximately midday on 14 June 2006, a small block and ash flow came down the 
upper Opak/Gendol River valley (Figures 10 and 11), causing BPPTK to order an 
immediate evacuation of Kaliadem (Bebeng) village, and forcing the remaining residents 
to flee down the mountain. The overall damage to Kaliadem village is shown in Figure 
12, which is taken from a similar vantage point to Figure 11.  
 
Two volunteers remained behind to assist with evacuations, and retreated to a concrete 
bunker specifically designed to withstand a pyroclastic flow, with heavy doors, running 
water and an oxygen supply. However, a second, and much larger, block and ash flow 
occurred at approximately 3 pm. The bunker was damaged (Figure 13) and the two men  
were killed.  
 
The approximate path of the large pyroclastic flow on 14 June is shown in Figure 14. It 
travelled approximately 4 km from the summit, and divided into two lobes on either side 
of Kaliadem village.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 14th June block and ash flow viewed from Merapi golf course (permission of S. Bronto) 
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Figure 11 Advancing front of the 12 pm 14 June block and ash flow from Kaliadem village  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Kaliadem village after the 14 June block and ash flow (note partial burial of shrine) 
 
 
  
GNS Science Report 2007/07  15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Bunker in Kaliadem village where two men lost their lives 
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Figure 14 Sketch map of Kaliadem / Bebeng village showing 14 June pyroclastic flows. Yellow hatched 
area denotes approximate location of village destroyed by flow 
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4.5.1 Damage to buildings in Kaliadem village 
In addition to taking two lives, the larger block and ash flow on 14 June 2006 caused 
considerable damage to many buildings in Kaliadem/Bebeng as it over-rode the earlier 
flow. Houses were buried by several metres of flow material, and some roofs were 
crushed by falling debris. The blocks from the lava dome were extremely degassed and 
highly crystalline (Newhall, pers. comm.). Consequently, the flow material was not as hot 
as might have been expected for freshly erupted juvenile material, and most buildings 
damaged by the flow were impacted by the blocks, but not burned (Figures 15 and 16). 
Some buildings were slightly scorched on their exteriors by smouldering woody debris 
entrained within the flow (Figure 16). Approximately ten metres from the lower extent of 
the flow in Kaliadem, plastic sheeting that had been wrapped around a house to prevent 
ash from entering the building was not melted by the 14 June flows (Figure 17). The 
margins of the flow were sharp both in Kaliadem village and to the west, where a lobe of 
the flow destroyed a road slightly below the village (Figure 18). The western lobe of the 
flow in the upper Opak River had very abrupt damage margins. Foliage was not even 
singed only a few meters from the edge of the flow (Figure 18). 
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Figure 15 House destroyed by impact of blocks during 14 June 2006 block and ash flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Partially-buried and scorched house in Kaliadem 
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Figure 17 House in Kaliadem wrapped in plastic to exclude ash  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Road close to Kaliadem partially covered by debris from 14 June flows (note sharp 
boundaries) 
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5. AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS 
5.1 Overview of agricultural practices around Merapi 
The land use around Merapi can be described as high-intensity, low-technology, 
subsistence tropical agriculture (Figure 19). Farm sizes are typically between one and 
two hectares, and may support families ranging from an elderly couple to a large 
extended family of up to ten people. The Yogyakarta region has a year-round tropical 
growing season that is typically divided into a wet season (October to March) and a dry 
season (April to September).  
 
 
Figure 19 Typical paddy-type agriculture on the south flank of Merapi 
 
There are few inputs into farms. Fertiliser inputs are low, and usually consist of manure 
from farm animals such as cows, goats or sheep. The team found no evidence of the 
use of mineral fertilisers. New high-yield varieties of rice have been introduced over the 
past ten years, with considerable success. As in New Zealand, there are no subsidies or 
government assistance for farmers (D. Indradewa, pers. comm.). Some use of pesticide 
sprays, from a knapsack-type dispenser, was observed.    
 
5.1.1 Farm types 
Paddy-grown rice is the preferred crop for farmers. It is a traditional favourite, well-suited 
to the centuries-old paddy-style farming. While the economic returns are less than for 
other cash crops, farmers perceive rice to be a low-risk crop due to its resilience to 
pests, and the low labour demands once it is established (D. Indradewa, pers. comm.).  
 
Secondary cash crops are part of the rotational practices used by all farmers, and 
include tobacco, corn, maize, chilli peppers, tomatoes, watermelons, taro, carrots, 
bananas, cabbages and peanuts. Successful harvests of cash crops offer good 
economic returns for farmers but are more susceptible to disease, pests and climatic 
variations.  
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Livestock are mainly kept to produce meat for domestic consumption. Typical farm 
animals include cows, oxen, sheep, goats, chickens, and ducks. There appears to be 
limited milking of animals in the region, and that which occurs is centred mainly on 
Kaliadem.  
 
5.1.2 Lowland/upland division and influence on seasonality 
The topography of the Merapi region has a significant influence on agricultural practices. 
There is a clear division between lowland areas, which have a secure water supply 
allowing irrigation throughout the year, and upland areas which do not have a secure 
water supply in the dry season.  
 
In lowland areas, the constant water supply allows preferred crops (mainly rice, which is 
water-dependent) to be grown year-round, with three to four harvests per year possible. 
Productivity is high on lowland farms, with rice yielding up to seven tonnes per hectare.  
 
Upland areas are able to grow preferred crops during the wet season, but during the dry 
season, when the reliable water supply is lost, must fall back on secondary cash crops. 
As a result, only two to three harvests per year are typically possible, and the 
productivity is also lower and usually around 1.5 tonnes per hectare (D. Indradewa, pers. 
comm.).  
 
The team visited the Merapi region during the dry season in 2006. Irrigated lowland soils 
were moist, but the upland soils were dry and dusty, particularly on the upper slopes of 
the volcano. Rice crops were rarely observed in upland farms. When rice crops were 
seen, they were at a mature stage of development with developed seed-heads, ready for 
harvest.  We observed a wide variety of cash crops in upland regions, with nearly all the 
crops listed in Section 5.1.1 present at various stages of growth. Less diversity was 
observed in lowland farms, with only rice, tobacco, chili peppers and corn observed.  
 
5.2 Observed impacts of volcanic activity on crops 
The main volcanic hazard affecting agriculture was tephra fall, derived from convecting 
plumes rising off the block and ash flows from dome collapse events.  While block and 
ash flows were limited to the western and southern flanks, the prevailing winds 
distributed ashfalls more widely around all sectors of the volcano (Figure 6). Farms in 
the direct path of block and ash flows were destroyed (for example, at Petung and 
Kaliadem). Local authorities estimated that by late July 2006, up to 3,000 hectares of 
agricultural land had been destroyed by the eruption. The sharp nature of the margins of 
block and ash debris flows was noted in Section 4.5.1. Vegetation within a metre or two 
of flows was typically scorched by the flow debris, but the team noted signs of regrowth 
and recovery of the vegetation within ten days or so of the initial damage.  
 
5.2.1 Crop vulnerability 
Crop vulnerability was very dependent on crop type. Root and low-growing vegetables, 
such as carrots, potatoes, onions and cabbages, were consistently observed to be the 
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most resilient to ashfall. A likely explanation is that these vegetables tend to be shielded 
by taller plants (such as chilli peppers, tomatoes, tobacco or peanuts) which provided a 
tephra-shadow effect. Plants with shiny leaves, such as cabbages, also appear to be 
able to shed ash readily, which decreases their vulnerability. However, plants with large, 
hairy leaves, such as tobacco, are efficient traps for ash and are very vulnerable.  
 
The maturity of a plant was also observed to be an important factor in determining the 
degree of physical damage. However, there was no general relationship between stage 
of development and damage, and different crops appeared to be vulnerable to ashfall at 
different stages of their development. For example, rice was vulnerable during mature 
stages, with damage apparent to the seed-head, but was resilient during initial stages of 
development. In comparison, corn was vulnerable during early to mid-stage 
development but quite resilient when mature.   
 
Our field observations on the relative vulnerabilities of crops grown in the Merapi region 
are presented in Table 3. For each crop we have described the vulnerable parts and 
stages of development, and combined these with our field observations to assign a 
relative vulnerability to each one, using a four-point scale of ‘high’, ‘moderate’, ‘some’ 
and ‘low’.  
 
5.2.2 Local adaptations 
Agricultural experts expected there to be some adjustment to planting strategies, with 
farmers moving towards planting more resilient plants in the short term (D. Indradewa, 
pers. comm.).  We observed that in many areas, local farmers had started to plant more 
resilient crops such as carrots, potatoes, onions and cabbage. Most farmers appear to 
have adopted a wait-and-see attitude in response to the ashfall, and were following 
normal crop rotation practices rather than abandoning crops and ploughing them under 
to start again.  
 
5.2.3 Influence of seasonality on crop impacts 
On the basis of previous experience at Merapi, farmers and agricultural experts we 
consulted indicated that impacts of eruptions on agriculture are less severe during the 
wet season. Daily monsoonal rains wash ash and aerosol deposits from plants rapidly, 
and are also thought to integrate the ash into the soil more rapidly.  
 
5.2.4 Observed impacts of ashfall on crops 
Our field observations on the impacts of volcanic ash on local crops are also 
summarised in Table 3. Three main categories of damage were recorded in the field, 
and these are discussed further below. It is important to note that these field 
observations have not been followed up by further laboratory-based studies.  
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5.2.4.1 Acid damage 
Surface coatings on fresh volcanic ash are highly acidic due to the presence in the 
plume of aerosols composed of the strong mineral acids H2SO4, HCl and HF (Witham et 
al., 2005; Stewart et al., 2006). Fresh volcanic ash therefore has the potential to cause 
acid damage when it is deposited on vegetation. In addition to tephra fall, plants may 
also be exposed to acidic volcanic gases such as SO2, H2S, HCl and HF, which can also 
interact with moisture in the atmosphere to form vog (volcanic fog) and acid rain. 
 
In general, acid deposition onto vegetation (natural and crops) can cause the following 
impacts (Environment Canada, 2007): 
? it can alter the protective waxy surface of leaves, lowering disease resistance (plants 
can usually replace leached cations, even when treated to a low pH rain, but 
exceptional damage and leaching can occur when the cell membrane has been 
damaged); 
? it may inhibit plant germination and reproduction; 
? it accelerates soil weathering and removal of nutrients; 
? it makes some toxic elements, such as aluminium, more soluble (high aluminium 
concentrations in soil can prevent the uptake and use of nutrients by plants). 
 
See Appendix 2 for further information on acid deposition damage to vegetation, and a 
brief review of the impacts of historic eruptions on vegetation.  
 
Acid damage to vegetation can occur as a result of tephra fall, but can also occur when 
there is little or no tephra deposition on plants, as the acidity may arise from volcanic 
gases, vog or precipitation. Thus, signs of damage to plants in the absence of tephra fall, 
or where only traces of tephra have fallen, are likely to be primarily due to effects of 
acidification, rather than additional effects such as physical smothering and inhibition of 
photosynthesis (discussed further in Section 5.2.4.2).  
 
In areas which received light tephra falls (<2 mm), typical signs of acid damage were 
plants with dry, yellowish and curling leaves. This damage was unlikely to be due to 
moisture stress alone, as it was observed in lowland areas with a plentiful water supply.  
 
In areas that received tephra falls of at least 3 mm, signs of damage were more severe 
and included plants with yellowed and blackened leaves. As the thickness of deposited 
tephra increased, more extreme cases of acid damage were observed, including plants 
with burnt, shrivelled leaves that had died and were being shed by the plant (Figure 20). 
Fruit would often be burnt in appearance (Figure 20). In Petung, which received 20 mm 
tephra fall, the damage to chilli peppers was so severe that the entire crop was lost in 
this district.  
 
Acidification effects may be exacerbated by tephra fall occurring during the dry season. 
In the rainy season any deposited tephra is likely to be quickly washed off plants, but in 
the dry season, the small amount of condensation that gathers in the mornings on the 
plants may provide enough moisture to leach acidity from the tephra onto the plants, but 
not enough to wash the ash off.  
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Table 3 Summary of observed impacts of ashfall on crops 
Crop Vulnerability 
rank 
Vulnerable parts of 
plant 
Vulnerable stages of 
development 
Ash thickness versus damage 
(selected examples) 
Attempted mitigation 
methods and their success 
Rice Low  
 
Seed-head 
(development of 
grains inhibited) 
During final stages of seed-
head development (mature 
rice) 
 
 
1. Traces of ash (<1 mm) appear to cause no damage 
and are regarded by many farmers as beneficial 
2. Damage to seed-head with 5 mm ash (waypoint 38) 
3. Waypoint 117 with 15 mm ash: 
- mature rice = 50% loss (Rp1.5 million damage) 
- juvenile rice = 25 % loss 
- baby rice = no expected loss 
Washing of juvenile rice in 
paddy with irrigation water.   
Natural cleaning by 
condensation in morning is 
highly effective. 
Tobacco High Broad, hairy leaves 
trap ash and will die 
eventually if not 
cleaned 
Flowers are very 
sensitive 
Tobacco is vulnerable 
throughout its life cycle due to 
the tendency of its leaves to 
trap ash, and is particularly 
vulnerable during flowering. 
Smothering of mature plants 
occurs at 20 mm ashfall.  
 
1. Damage to leaves begins at 1-2 mm ash 
2. The crop was written off with repeated 2-3 mm 
ashfalls over 4 weeks (waypoint 17) 
3. At waypoint 49, the leaves on a mature plant were 
falling off with 20 mm ash 
Shaking the crop is only partially 
successful but is commonly 
used. 
Cleaning leaves by hand causes 
abrasion to leaves and has 
limited success. 
Damaged broad leaves at base 
are often pulled off. 
Tomatoes High Leaves, flowers and 
fruit are all very 
vulnerable. 
Nearly all stages are 
vulnerable, but mature plants 
are particularly vulnerable. 
 
1. Damage to leaves begin at 1-2 mm ash 
2. With repeated 5-10 mm ashfalls over a month, the 
crop was written off and the fruit rotted on the vine 
(waypoint 47) 
Shaking is only partially 
successful. 
Hand cleaning causes abrasion 
to leaves and has limited 
success. 
Carrots Low  
 
None encountered as 
leaves tend to shed 
ash 
None encountered 1. Mature carrots were unaffected with 10mm ashfall 
(waypoint 48) 
Inter-row planting between taller 
plants was effective, though 
probably not intentional. 
Onions Some  
 
Tips of leaves are 
vulnerable; the length 
of the dead leaf tip 
was longer in ashfall-
affected areas and 
leaves were drier. 
Juvenile onions are 
vulnerable but are expected 
to recover well. 
1. Damage to leaf tips wtih 2-3 mm ash (waypoint 17). 
2. Damage to leaf tips with 15-20 mm ash (waypoint 
80). 
Some isolated cases of shaking, 
which has limited success. 
Cabbage Moderate  
 
Outer leaves 
discolour and rot. 
In extreme cases, 
inner leaves would 
also rot. 
Mature plants most 
vulnerable 
1. Young cabbages were unaffected by 10 mm ash 
(waypoint 48) 
2. 90% loss of a cabbage plot with 20mm (waypoint 
80) 
Washed in small irrigation 
channels immediately after 
harvest to remove ash; this was 
highly successful. 
Chilli peppers High Flowers are highly 
vulnerable, and all 
leaves are vulnerable 
to acid damage, 
particularly when 
young.  
The fruit also is 
vulnerable.  
Both mature (3-4 month old) 
and juvenile plants are 
vulnerable, but there is 
greater economic loss when 
plants are mature as fruit are 
lost.  
The flowering stage is highly 
vulnerable.  
1. Some leaf and fruit damage with 0.5 mm ash 
(waypoint 6) 
2. All flowers damaged and some leafs damaged with 
2-3 mm (waypoint 17) 
3. 60% of crop near maturity lost with 2.5 mm ash 
(waypoint 96) 
3. 95% loss of crop at all stages of development at 
chilli pepper farm with 15-20 mm ashfall (waypoint 
73), with severe damage to fruit and leaves.  
4. 100% loss of crop with 20 mm ash (wp 80).  
Shaking was attempted, but with 
limited success.  
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Table 3 continued 
 
Crop Vulnerability 
rank 
Vulnerable parts of 
plant 
Vulnerable stages of 
development 
Ash thickness versus damage 
(selected examples) 
Attempted mitigation 
methods and their success 
Peanuts Some  Leaves are efficient at 
shedding tephra 
None encountered - Shaking 
Oranges Moderate  
 
Skin (if not cleaned, skin 
would grow around ash 
which would form 
nodules ~1mm in size. 
Leaves showed some 
limited damage. 
- 1. Some leaf and fruit damage with 15-20mm ash 
(waypoint 73) 
 
None encountered – 
uneconomic to clean each 
piece of fruit 
Cauliflower Moderate  
 
Seed-head and leaves 
vulnerable to acid 
damage. 
Mature plants most 
vulnerable with an open 
seed-head 
1. Seed-head and leaves damaged (plants written off) 
with 15-20mm (waypoint 73) 
None encountered 
Cucumbers Insufficient 
Observations 
- - - None encountered 
Corn/maize High Leaves are vulnerable. 
The cob is usually well 
protected from tephra 
infiltration. 
Juvenile corn is most 
vulnerable.   
Mature corn would die 
earlier than expected, but 
cobs would ripen (some 
seed-heads wouldn’t fill) 
and could often be 
harvested. 
1. Corn crop written off 4 weeks from harvest with 5-
7mm ash (waypoint 19) 
2. 60% harvest of a mature crop with 20 mm ash 
(waypoint 80) 
3. Mature crop (2.5 m high) abandoned despite cobs 
appearing unaffected, with 25 mm ash (waypoint 
48) 
None encountered 
Potatoes/Taro Some  
 
Leaves are vulnerable 
but root crop is usually 
unaffected. 
Young plants vulnerable. 1. Leaves damaged by tephra fall, 100% loss 
expected with 4-5 mm ash (waypoint 17) 
None encountered 
Bananas Insufficient 
Observations 
 
Leaves are very 
effective collectors of 
ash; the fruit appeared 
to be unaffected. 
- - None encountered 
Lemons Moderate  
 
Leaves vulnerable. 
Fruit could be expected 
to suffer from same 
problems as oranges. 
- 1. Acid damage to leaves with 2-3 mm ash (waypoint 
17) 
None encountered 
Other trees Low  
 
Leaves on trees within 
or at margins of block 
and ash flows were 
scorched, but many 
showed signs of 
recovery after 10 days. 
Acid and abrasion 
damage to leaves and 
flowers. 
Young and small trees 
most vulnerable to block 
and ash flows. 
1. Trees with trunks greater than 25 cm survived block 
and ash flow in Woro river 
2. Acid damage to leaves with > 1 mm ash 
(widespread isolated cases) 
3. Flowers damaged by acid and abrasion – 15-
20mm: possible tephra surge (waypoint 80) 
None encountered 
Watermelons Insufficient 
Observations 
 
Not grown in any tephra fall areas 
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5.2.4.2 Smothering of plants  
In addition to causing acid damage to plants, tephra falls can also physically smother plants 
and inhibit photosynthesis. This effect is unlikely to be important in areas of light tephra fall, 
but will become more pronounced as the thickness of deposited tephra increases. Our 
observations suggested that light tephra falls would often be restricted to the upper parts of 
plants, whereas heavier tephra falls would also affect the lower leaves and thus cover the 
entire plant. A tobacco crop smothered by approximately 35 mm tephra fall is shown in 
Figure 22. Plants that had been covered by tephra for several weeks showed signs of both 
acid damage and photosynthetic inhibition (Figure 21). Longer exposure periods are thought 
to result in stunting of plant growth.  
 
Some plants were able to adapt to tephra smothering by sprouting new leaves. For example, 
clean new sprouts were observed on lemon trees that had been covered (approximately 60-
80% of plant) by ash for over four weeks.  
 
With heavier ashfalls (>30 mm), in addition to the effects on photosynthesis noted above, 
leaves become weighed down and eventually stems will break. Smothering was a particular 
problem for plants with large, broad and hairy leaves that trap ash readily, such as tobacco 
(Figure 22). Damage observed included stunted growth and withering of the leaves. Crops 
growing near roads would often suffer the greatest impacts because of ash remobilised by 
vehicles.  
 
An additional problem with ashfall contamination of tobacco was that harvested leaves were 
rejected by processing plants because of the strong associated sulphurous smell, and 
concerns about the presence of cristobalite in the ash, which has the potential to cause 
silicosis.  
 
5.2.4.3 Ashfall damage to fruit and vegetable skins 
In areas that had received tephra falls for a number of weeks, such as Petung, Magelang and 
Selo, fruit and vegetable skins that had not been cleaned were beginning show signs of 
damage. Unwashed skin appeared to have incorporated the tephra by growing around it and 
creating small (approximately 1 mm diameter) nodules within the skin (Figure 23). These 
nodules could not be washed off and were difficult to pick out. Although the fruit within was 
undamaged and edible, traders rejected this fruit because it was ‘ashy’.  
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Figure 20 Left photo: presumed acid aerosol damage to chilli-pepper plants in Petung. Right photo: presumed 
acid damage to tomato plants in Magelang 
 
 
Figure 21 Wilted tobacco leaf in Selo. This plant had been cleaned after being covered by tephra for 3 weeks 
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Figure 22 Tobacco crop smothered by ~35mm of tephra fall in Magelang 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Tephra inclusion on the skin of an orange from Petung 
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5.2.5 Attempts to mitigate ashfall impacts on crops 
The team observed several different approaches being used to attempt to mitigate the 
impacts of ashfall on crops. The most effective method was washing crops in water 
immediately after harvest. This worked very well for cabbages when washed in irrigation 
channels immediately after harvest. However, in general, it is very difficult to clean ash from 
leaves, and it becomes more difficult as more time elapses from deposition of the ash. 
Rinsing with water is the best way to remove ash, but frequently is not possible because of 
water shortages. Shaking crops to remove ash was a common practice, but is time-
consuming and does not completely remove ash. One farmer interviewed by the team 
estimated that it took him two hours to shake a corn crop of 10 m by 20 m in area. Our 
observation of this crop, six hours later, indicated that most leaves still had a residual coating 
of ash. Wiping the ash from the surface of leaves does not remove all ash, and also causes 
abrasional damage.  
 
Some farmers attempted to remove ash from vulnerable crops such as chilli peppers, but in 
general, mitigation methods appear to be uneconomic for most crops.  
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5.3 Observed impacts of volcanic activity on livestock 
Most animals were housed within feedlots, which despite being quite rudimentary structures 
appeared to offer good protection from ashfall (Figure 24). Perhaps as a result, incidences of 
health problems commonly associated with volcanic eruptions (such as respiratory tract and 
eye irritation) were generally low. 
 
The main observed impact on livestock was weight loss from eating ash-covered fodder. 
Animals are fed primarily from manually-cut fodder obtained from the abundant growth on 
and around farmlands. Thus, grazing animals usually do not feed directly on ash-covered 
pasture. However, following ashfalls, farmers found it difficult to get access to clean water or 
clean fodder. During the cutting and transport of the fodder, much of the ash was shaken off. 
However, fine ash was retained on the fodder, and was subsequently ingested by livestock 
(Figure 24).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 Livestock feeding on ash-covered fodder in Petung  
 
The weight loss of cows on the southern flank of Merapi, particularly at Kaliadem and 
Petung, resulted in many animals dropping in value from a pre-eruption value of Rp 7-8 
million (NZ$ 1,200-1,400) to Rp 2-6 million (NZ$350-1,100) per animal as many farmers were 
forced to sell off stock before they died. There was no information available about whether 
the cows recovered following relocation and an ash-free diet. 
 
Farmers in the village of Kaliadem, many of whom earn their living raising cattle, were unable 
to gather fodder following the ash falls associated with 14 June block and ash flows. This 
area had also lost water supplies following the 14 June flows, and the Umbul Lanang spring 
dried up creating significant water shortages in the area. This created major problems in 
obtaining water for farm animals, as relief water supplies were only for human consumption.  
As a result this was one of the worst-affected regions the team visited, and has been used 
here as a case study.   
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The Jakarta Post reported that on 20 June, there were 450 dairy cows in the Kaliadem area, 
each producing an average of 15 litres of milk per day, to be sold at Rp 1,500 per litre. No 
dairy cows were observed during our visit to the village as they were located several hundred 
metres further up the flank and safety reasons prohibited movement into this area. However, 
a number of villagers reported that milk production had significantly dropped, probably 
because of complications related to both the water shortages and the contamination of 
fodder with ash. Many of the farmers decided to sell the cows for what they could, rather than 
risk the cattle dying. The cows were sold for between Rp 5.5 million and Rp 6 million (NZ$ 
1000-1100). They normally sell for between Rp 7 and 8 million (Jakarta Post, 20/06/06).  Due 
to the limited extent of the damage however, traders specifically travelled to Kaliadem to buy 
cattle at marked down prices. Most farmers were simply glad to be able to sell their cattle and 
there were no feelings of exploitation.   
 
There were some reports of animals being put off their food due to tephra contamination, as 
was reported after the 1995/96 Ruapehu eruptions (Neild et al., 1998). This may account for 
the weight loss, but it is also possible the tephra in the gut caused metabolic problems.  
There is also the possibility of chemical poisoning of the animals by aerosols attached to the 
tephra, but without autopsies of affected animals, the exact nature of the weight loss remains 
speculative. 
 
5.4 Potential impacts of volcanic activity on soil fertility 
Tephra deposition usually results in long-term benefits to soil fertility (Blong, 1984; Lansing et 
al., 2001), such as increased sulphur, selenium, and halogen availability (Cronin et al., 1998; 
2003). However it was unclear what impact the deposition of ash from the 2006 eruption 
would have on soils on farmland situated on and surrounding the volcanic edifice. Many of 
the farmers spoken to by the team acknowledged the likely long term benefits. However, the 
nature of these benefits and the time scales of the processes involved were not well 
established and were under discussion among local soil scientists.  Among those we spoke 
to, there was a common belief, based on previous experience at Merapi, that improved soil 
fertility would take approximately three to four years to manifest itself (Figure 25; D. 
Indradewa, pers. comm.). However, soil fertility may be negatively affected in the short term, 
because the mineral components of the ash may not be available for plant uptake (Cronin et 
al., 2003). Experts we consulted suggested that manure fertilisation may be required to 
maintain soil fertility. It is not known whether ash leachate analysis was conducted following 
the eruption to predict what impact the deposited ash would have on soils. 
 
Tephra and soil samples were brought back to New Zealand for laboratory testing to 
determine their chemical composition. Results, and a discussion of implications for soil 
fertility, will be presented in a subsequent report.  
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Figure 25 Sketch of estimated soil fertility response by Indonesian soil scientists (D. Indradewa, pers. comm.) 
 
 
5.5 Production losses 
At 13 of the farms visited, farmers were asked to describe the damage to their crops, and 
estimate their production losses (Table 4). These farms were located in agricultural areas, 
such as Kaliurang, Klaten, and Magelang which had experienced between ~2 and 25mm of 
tephra fall. There was no systematic selection of farms; rather farmers working in their fields 
were approached in areas that had suffered tephra damage to production crops. Losses 
appear to be due primarily to the reduced quality of crops fetching lower prices, and there 
were no reports of commodity prices for crops increasing due to shortages (D. Indradewa, 
pers. comm.).   
 
In many cases, the farmers were expecting severe losses to their crops (i.e. 80-100% loss).  
This represents significant economic disruption and potential hardship for the farmers and 
their dependents. The small farms (numbers 4,7 and 9) appear to be particularly vulnerable, 
which may compound the difficulties they already experience in producing sufficient crops to 
survive from small plots of land. These losses may be partially mitigated by the opportunity 
for further crops later in the year, compared to the usual single crop per year in New Zealand. 
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Table 4 Estimated production losses for individual farms1  
 
Farmer estimates of damage Farm 
number 
Farm 
size  
(ha) 
GPS waypoint Tephra 
thickness (mm) Crops(s) % loss Monetary loss (Rp) 
Tobacco 80 
Chilli-peppers 90 
Onions 20 
1 1.5 17 2-3 
Cabbages 30 
2,500,000 
(combined total) 
2 1.0 20 5 Rice (mature) 50 1,500,000 
3 1.0 47 20 Rice and Onions 60 550,000 
Tobacco 100 
Tomatoes  100 
4 0.5 47 20 
Rice 80 
 
700,000 
(combined total) 
5 0.5 49 25 Tobacco 70 3,000,000 
Tobacco  75 2,000,000 6 2.0 49 25 
Peanuts 30 400,000 
7 0.8 73 15-20 Chilli-peppers 95 1,500,000 
Corn 90 
Chilli-peppers 90 
8 3.0 80 20-25 
Potatoes 20 
2,300,000 
(combined total) 
Tobacco  90 9 0.4 80 20-25 
Chilli-peppers 100 
1,500,000 
10 0.5 80 20-25 Corn 40 unknown 
Cabbage 80 11 3.0 80 20-25 
Oranges – skin 
damage 
90 
unknown 
Chilli-peppers 50 3,000,000 12 2.05 96 2-3 
Tomatoes 50 3,000,000 
Rice (mature – 3 
months) 
50 1,500,000 
Rice (juvenile – 2 
months) 
25 500,000 
13  117 15 
Rice (young – 2 
weeks) 
0 0 
1 The approximate annual farm income for the region was in the range of Rp 5-50 million (D. Indradewa pers comm., 2006)  
 
 
 
5.6 Resilience of agricultural systems 
Many farms, particularly those high on the southern and western flanks of Merapi, are 
expected to lose up to 100% of damaged crops during the current rotation. However, 
because of the warm climate, fertile soils and good access to water (on the lowlands and 
during the wet season), the farms are anticipated to recover rapidly following cessation of 
tephra falls, with many farmers predicting 2-3 harvests within the next 12 months. Thus, the 
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year-round growing season contributes substantially to resilience within this agricultural 
system, particularly for lowland farms. Lowland farmers are therefore able to choose 
preferred crops, such as rice, that will maximise returns.  
 
Upland farms are somewhat more vulnerable during the dry season, but farmers are still able 
to replant immediately if required. Our observations suggested that upland farmers add 
greater diversity to their selection of cash crops, to build more resilience into their farming 
systems, due to the unreliable water supply in upland regions.  But the increased resilience 
also helps reduce the impact of volcanic activity. The attitude that ‘if one crop fails then 
others will survive’ was frequently encountered by the team, with respect to crop selection 
practices. Our observations supported the effectiveness of this approach, with some farms 
affected by heavy ashfalls showing severe damage to some crops and virtually no damage to 
others. For instance, chilli pepper plants would be severely affected while other crops planted 
between them, such as carrots, would be almost unaffected.  
 
The naturally-high resilience of agricultural systems in the Merapi area is to some extent 
offset by the inability of most farmers to absorb financial losses. Farming in the area is only 
slightly above a subsistence level and many farmers spoken to by the team considered 
themselves unable to absorb the loss of even one crop rotation. This level of hardship was 
probably a motivating cause of farmers returning to the exclusion zone after being evacuated 
(discussed further in Chapter 7). Many farmers reported that they had few other options, and 
felt that they must ‘ride out’ the eruption (particularly those in the upland regions) and wait for 
the rains to wash crops and help integrate the tephra into the soil. Some farmers stated that if 
they were required to relocate, they would need government assistance to do so. However 
there was a low level of belief in the likelihood of government assistance following heavy 
expenditure in response to the magnitude 5.9 earthquake that occurred on 27 May 2006 in 
Yogyakarta province, causing over 4900 deaths.  
 
In New Zealand, the innate resilience of agricultural systems to volcanic ashfall is likely to be 
lower due to the temperate climate and confined growing season in most places. Typically 
only one or two crop rotations are possible during the growing season, and crops may be 
particularly vulnerable during spring with high photosynthesis and rainfall requirements 
potentially being disrupted by smothering ash fall and ash leachate impacting soil and water 
chemistry. 
 
5.7 Summary 
The agricultural sector was very vulnerable to the impacts of the 2006 Merapi eruption, 
although this vulnerability was not uniform across the sector and indeed in some instances a 
high degree of resilience was observed on many farms (especially those growing rice).  
Access to a reliable water supply appeared to be a key factor in overall farm resilience, 
although a diverse selection of crops grown on each farm also increased resilience. 
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6. INFRASTRUCTURE IMPACTS  
6.1 Overview of infrastructure in the Merapi region 
Java, with a population of 124 million, is the world’s most densely-populated island, and the 
Merapi region is no exception. The southern flanks of Merapi volcano have an approximate 
density of 1400 people/km2 (Thouret et al., 2000).  
 
The general quality of life in Java is relatively high for a developing country, largely due to the 
influence of income from tourism. The GDP (per capita) was reported to be US $3,800 (CIA 
Factbook, 2006). Homes are permanent and solidly-constructed although masonry is 
generally unreinforced and therefore highly vulnerable to damage in earthquakes (J. 
Cousins, pers. comm.). Houses are typically constructed from cemented lava blocks with roof 
construction from bamboo and clay tiles (Figure 26). Almost without exception, homes have 
electricity, running water, and underground sewage disposal systems (either via sewer lines 
or pit toilets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26 Interior of typical house in Merapi region showing lava block masonry and bamboo and clay tile roof 
 
Rural roads are mostly paved asphalt and are typically one to one-and-a-half lanes, or three 
metres, wide (Figure 18). Most people appear to own or have access to a vehicle, ranging 
from late model imported cars and 4WD vehicles, to small motorcycles such as mopeds or 
scooters. The city of Yogyakarta (population approximately 0.5 million) does not have a multi-
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lane highway system, but has a network of paved roads which are frequently heavily 
congested.  
 
Water is drawn either from wells or established drainage systems, large and small, on the 
flanks of the volcano. In some locations higher up on Merapi, wells draw water from 
underground aquifers into enclosed pumphouses, from which the water is distributed downhill 
through a system of pipes and irrigation canals to houses and farms.  
 
Indonesians make extensive use of cellular telephones, with over 10% of the national 
population, or approximately 25 million people, owning at least one (AOEMA, 2003). Cellular 
towers (Figure 27) dot the landscape, both high and low on the volcano.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Cellular repeater antenna near Kaliadem 
 
Two major international airports service the Yogyakarta region of central Java: Yogyakarta 
airport, and Surakarta (Solo) airport. Several tens of flights per day pass through each of 
these.  
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6.2 Impacts on infrastructure 
6.2.1 Roofs 
Impacts of tephra on roofs were minimal to non-existent despite tephra depths of several 
centimetres being recorded in some places. The team did not observe any tephra damage to 
roofs, or any mitigative or cleanup actions being practised, although some people described 
doing hand-powered ash removal (e.g. sweeping) from their roofs.  
 
In the village of Petung, at approximately 1100 m elevation on Merapi’s south flank, a 
damaged clay tile roof was observed (Figure 28). However, it was unclear whether the 
damage to the roof was the result of the 2-3 cm accumulation of tephra on it, or whether it 
had been damaged by the magnitude 5.8 earthquake of 27 May 2006. The hole in the roof is 
unlikely to have been caused by a block falling, as the bamboo supports underneath appear 
to be intact.  
 
According to Johnston (1997) and Spence et al. (2005), dry tephra loading in the range 
experienced during the 2006 eruption of Merapi is not expected to cause damage to roofs 
because it causes loadings of <1 kPa. This is consistent with our observations. However, if 
the tephra had been wet rather than dry, increased damage to roofs would have been 
expected. The only confirmed damage to roofs attributable to the eruption was in Bebeng, 
where airborne blocks from the 3 p.m. 14 June block and ash flow demolished roofs (Figure 
14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 Damaged roof in Petung 
 
6.2.2 Building structures 
The only major damage to buildings sustained during the 2006 eruption of Merapi was 
caused by the large block and ash flow that occurred at 3 p.m. on 14 June. Buildings in the 
path of the flow were completely destroyed. Houses were buried up to roof level, roofs and 
windows were smashed and debris entered the interiors (Figures 15 and 16).  
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6.2.3 Transportation 
Despite widespread deposition of tephra on roads, no disruptions to transportation were 
reported other than the road that was destroyed by the 14 June block and ash flow below 
Kaliadem (Figures 18 and 29). Several metres depth of debris were deposited on this road, 
and heavy equipment will be required to re-open it.  
 
None of the vehicle-owning villagers we spoke with reported problems caused by tephra to 
their vehicles, such as to air intakes. The field driver for our team reported that there was no 
need for additional maintenance to the vehicle despite five days in the field in conditions of 
tephra resuspension on roads. Tephra was washed from the vehicle and engine with 
household water at the end of every field day, which is reportedly common practice among 
vehicle owners in Indonesia.  
 
6.2.4 Water and wastewater 
The damage to water installations and spring wells in Bebeng village caused by the 14 June 
block and ash flows resulted in thousands of people losing their water supply. Newspapers 
reported that 12,000 people were without water (e.g. Malaysia Sun, 14 June 2006). This 
greatly increased the demand on emergency water tankers, with the Sleman district local 
government distributing 14,000 litres of clean water daily. The International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) also provided water relief to villages (Figure 
30). From 19 to 25 June alone, the Red Cross distributed a total of 1,017,000 litres of water 
(IFRC staff, pers. comm.). Apart from these incidences, no other major damage or disruption 
to water and wastewater services was reported. Some villagers spoken to by the team 
reported that they obtained water from relief organisations, or had to switch their supply from 
surface water to well water, because of tephra contamination.  
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Figure 29 View into Kaliadem on 5 July 2006, showing the mantle of debris from the 14 June block and ash 
flow  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Water distribution facility at Red Cross evacuation camp at Merapi Golf, 5 July 2006 
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Figure 31 Snapped electricity pole in Kaliadem 
 
6.2.5 Electricity 
The only report of disrupted electricity service during the 2006 eruption came from the village 
of Kaliadem, where power poles and lines were snapped by the block and ash flows of 14 
June (Figure 31). The destroyed buildings suffered permanent electricity loss, but the areas 
adjacent to the flows, which lost power initially, regained it within several hours. 
 
6.2.6 Telecommunications 
As with electricity, Kaliadem was the only site of loss of telecommunications during the 2006 
eruption. Immediately after the larger block and ash flow on 14 June, cellular telephone 
service in the village suffered in quality. Whether this resulted from over-usage, physical 
destruction of communications infrastructure, or the presence of ash in the air obscuring 
signals is not clear.  
 
6.2.7 Air travel 
The two major airports in the region were relatively unaffected by the 2006 eruption. 
However, some flights to and from Surakarta (Solo), Semarang, and Yogyakarta were 
diverted occasionally due to ash from Merapi (WHO, 2006). Other than these diversions, 
there were no reports of ground damage to aircraft or aeronautical facilities and operations. 
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7. SOCIAL IMPACTS AND EVACUATION 
7.1 Population growth on the flanks of Merapi 
As noted in Section 6.1, the population density in the vicinity of Merapi volcano is extremely 
high, with an estimated 1.1 million people living on its slopes in 2000 (Thouret et al., 2000), in 
approximately 300 villages above 200 metres in elevation. Of these, some 440,000 people 
live in high-risk areas subject to pyroclastic flows, surges and lahars (Thouret et al., 2000).  
Population density on the Merapi edifice is >1400 people/km2 on the western and southern 
flanks of the volcano and the growth rate of the population was calculated as up to 3% 
annually in the mid-1990s (Thouret et al., 2000). This rate of growth is not limited to the 
Merapi region but is a general feature of Java, where it is reported that the population 
increased tenfold during the 20th century (Voight et al., 2000). This rapidly increasing 
population has put significant stress on the natural resources of Java, leading to marginal 
and hazardous regions such as the flanks of Merapi, being inhabited.  
 
Increasing population growth on the slopes of Merapi has led to a substantial increase in risk 
to human life over the past century (S. Bronto, pers. comm.., Thouret et al., 2000; Voight et 
al., 2000). The impacts of eruptions throughout the twentieth century have become 
increasingly devastating, despite their generally low explosivity. Lack of land-use planning is 
also likely to be a factor contributing to the increased vulnerability of the population.  
 
A 1978 hazard zone map of Merapi (Pardyanto et al., 1978) defines three areas termed 
‘forbidden zone’, ‘first danger zone’ and ‘second danger zone’, based on declining levels of 
hazard. These classifications are now regarded as outdated (Thouret et al., 2000), but the 
zones are still used in publications and by emergency management personnel and on 
signage. Thouret et al. (2000) estimate that the number of people living or working in the 
forbidden zone increased approximately twofold from 40,000 to 80,000 people between 1976 
and 1995, and is probably significantly greater now.  
 
In summary, all available information, including our observations, point to a steadily 
increasing volcanic risk around Merapi, driven by population growth and lack of land-use 
planning.  
 
7.2 Overview of the 2006 evacuation  
A key part of the social disruption caused by the 2006 eruption of Merapi was the evacuation 
of at-risk communities, mainly on the western and southern flanks of the volcano. Based on 
local and foreign media reports, non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports (e.g. UN and 
Red Cross), and discussions with Indonesian colleagues, the evacuation can be divided into 
five phases: 1) the initial evacuation; 2) the first return in mid-May; 3) the 27 May earthquake; 
4) alert-level raising and lowering surrounding the 14th June block and ash flow; and 5) the 
final return.  
 
The evacuation of vulnerable communities from the flanks of Merapi was for the most part an 
efficient and effective mitigation measure. However, aspects of the evacuation provide 
valuable lessons for future eruptions of Merapi and elsewhere. 
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7.2.1 Phase 1: the initial evacuation 
In early April 2006, the Indonesian government began logistical preparations for a volcanic 
crisis as volcano-seismic activity at Merapi began to increase. The evacuation of the most at-
risk communities began on 3 May, in advance of the alert level system reaching its highest 
level on 13 May. On 3 May, several hundred pregnant women and elderly people were 
evacuated at 10 a.m., and in the second phase, children were evacuated at 4 p.m.  
 
By 13 May, medical teams had been placed in strategic locations, and evacuation routes had 
been established (WHO Emergency Situation Report, 13/05/06). The Merapi Volcano 
Observatory (known locally as BPPTK) encouraged evacuation of communities on the 
western sector of the volcano within 8 km of the summit; on the southwest-west sector within 
10 km, and on the south-southeast sector within 8 km of the summit (S. Bronto, pers comm.).   
 
Large-scale evacuation took place following the announcement, and the Indonesian Red 
Cross reported that by 13 May, 6942 people had been evacuated. By 19 May, the Indonesian 
Red Cross (www.redcross.org.sg) reported that a total of 20,080 people were housed in 
emergency shelters as follows: 907 in Boyolali District, 8866 in Magelang, 6163 in Sleman, 
and 4144 in Klaten.   
 
Evacuations were followed up with searches by volunteers, soldiers, and police to locate 
those forgotten or refusing to evacuate. These efforts were scaled down once people began 
to return to the exclusion zone. 
 
There was a high degree of self-evacuation. In Sleman district, 4,000 of the 9,500 residents 
self-evacuated before emergency workers arrived (WHO Emergency Situation Report, 
13/05/06).  Emergency workers noted that many men chose to stay behind to watch over 
their farms and homes, whilst other evacuees remained with extended families at locations 
outside the evacuation zone (often causing overcrowding in the small houses) or in 
evacuation camps.  We observed three evacuation camps during the day that contained only 
women and children, all the men reported to have been in the exclusion zone tending to their 
farms.  Authorities seemed to allow farmers to return to their farms during the day, although it 
was unclear whether this was a formal policy.  Evacuees often travelled between camps and 
villages without prior notice, which made determining actual needs and planning response 
efforts more difficult (WHO Emergency Situation Report, 13/05/06). 
 
7.2.2 Phase 2: first return in mid-May 
Within days of the first evacuations, volcanic activity at Merapi continued intermittently but 
the expected large eruption did not occur. This uncertainty created difficulties for the 
authorities as the lack of an explosive eruption or a dome collapse led evacuees to believe 
that the evacuation may have been unnecessary or an over-reaction to the situation.  
However, according to the authorities, there was still significant potential for a larger eruption 
to occur as SO2 emissions continued to increase, and dome growth continued at several 
hundred thousand m3 per day.  As a result this return of people occurred with no lowering of 
the alert level and despite daily warnings from the BPPTK of the continuing danger (Dr. 
Sutikno Bronto pers. comm.).    
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A major concern for evacuees was the looting of temporarily-abandoned homes and farms. 
Financial pressures, such as un-tendered crops and livestock, were also a factor in 
motivating evacuees to return to their farms. On 18 May, up to 1800 people are believed to 
have returned to their home villages from evacuation camps (WHO Emergency Situation 
Report, 22/05/06). This trend continued as eruptive activity decreased further on 20 May, 
with many more farmers returning to their farms to tend damaged crops and feed livestock.  It 
was unclear from emergency management reports and from local interviews whether people 
decided to return on an individual basis or whether there was some peer pressure influence.  
A characteristic feature of this phase of the evacuation was that evacuees would travel to 
their farms during the day and return to the evacuation camps at night (as discussed above).  
 
7.2.3 Phase 3: 27 May earthquake and increased eruptive activity 
On the 27th of May a M 5.9 earthquake, with an epicentre ~30 km to the south-southwest of 
Merapi, struck the region killing over 5,800 people, injuring over 20,000, and destroying 
150,000 homes in the Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces.  This earthquake resulted in a 
large international response, coordinated by the United Nations.  Many of the emergency 
supplies pre-positioned for a large eruption from Merapi were diverted to the earthquake 
response.  The earthquake resulted in the closure of Yogyakarta airport, which hampered 
relief operations, downed telephone lines, caused power blackouts, disrupted transportation 
networks, and resulted in significant confusion and panic.  Logistical problems impeded the 
flow of aid, which caused some concern, particularly for emergency workers and 
volcanologists who were greatly concerned the earthquake may cause an increase in 
eruptive activity from Merapi volcano. 
 
The earthquake rapidly escalated the scale of emergency in Yogyakarta province from a 
largely internal Indonesian affair to a large scale multi-national disaster response. The 
volcanic eruption crisis and evacuation was eclipsed and overwhelmed by the earthquake 
response. 
 
Eruptive activity steadily increased during the weeks following the earthquake, leading to 
BPPTK releasing new evacuation recommendations for communities in hazardous areas.  
However, no large explosive eruption occurred as was feared by some emergency 
personnel.  Following the earthquake, good hazard awareness was shown by villagers on the 
flanks of Merapi as waves of villagers returned to evacuation camps in Klaten and Sleman 
(WHO, 2006). Both villagers and scientists feared that the earthquake could have 
destabilised the lava dome, thus increasing the risk of triggering a significant eruption. Many 
villagers interviewed expressed feelings of being ‘geologically spooked’ and indicated that 
their personal hazard perceptions had been significantly raised. This may explain the 
widespread self-evacuations that followed the earthquake.  
 
The earthquake did not cause catastrophic damage to villages on the Merapi edifice, but 
there was moderate damage to many villages. Evacuation camps already struggling with the 
evacuation from Merapi faced shortages of supplies as relief efforts shifted orientation toward 
the badly damaged area south of Yogyakarta. There were some reports of worsening 
sanitation problems and a general shortage of relief supplies in the ten-day period following 
the earthquake (OCHA Report 8, 3/06/06). Commodities reported to be in short supply were: 
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masks for respiratory protection, infant supplies, sanitary supplies and water (OCHA Report 
15, 22/06/06). A key requirement of many farmers was plastic sheeting to cover water tanks. 
According to local media reports, affected communities in Klaten complained about uneven 
aid distribution. 
 
7.2.4 Phase 4: confusion caused by lowering of alert level  
During early to mid-June, villagers had again begun to return home. On 13 June, after 
several days of low eruptive activity, BPPTK lowered the alert level from Level 4 (caution) to 
Level 3 (alert). The BPPTK reported through media releases to local media that its scientists 
believed the cracking of the lava dome on 8 June provided some release of pressure, 
resulting in reduced eruptive activity; although there is some contention about this analysis.  
 
This lowering of the alert level occurred despite the collapse of the Geger Boyo (a section of 
an old lava dome) on the 4th and 5th of June.  The Geger Boyo structure had previously 
restricted larger pyroclastic flows to the west and southwest sectors of the mountain, 
shielding the southeast flank of the volcano (Section 4.4).  By exposing the southern flank, a 
region with no recent history of such hazards suddenly had to come to terms with a greatly 
increased risk to possible pyroclastic flows from dome collapse events.  It appears this was 
not considered enough by the BPPTK to delay lowering the alert level.  
 
Following the lowered alert level, evacuees were trucked home to their villages, with several 
thousand returning on 13 June and more returning on 14 June. Despite the lowering of the 
alert level, villagers were advised to be on alert, and evacuation trucks remained on standby.   
 
On 14 June, there was a sudden increase in eruptive activity when a small block and ash 
flow came down the upper Opak/Gendol river valley around midday following a dome 
collapse. The BPPTK ordered an immediate evacuation of Kaliadem village by asking local 
people to activate the warning siren around 12 p.m., and approximately 15,000 people were 
evacuated (OCHA Report 17, 7 July). A much larger block and ash flow came down the 
valley at around 3 p.m., and buried part of Kaliadem village (Section 4.5). Fortunately most 
people had evacuated, but two volunteers perished within a bunker designed to protect 
villagers against such flows, suggesting that the future construction of such bunkers should 
be reviewed. 
 
Appeals were immediately made for masks, sunglasses, medicine for respiratory illnesses, 
eye drops, and oxygen in the Sleman District. There were some isolated cases of requests 
for clean water, medicine and food following the14 June flows (in Umbulharjo, Kepuharjo and 
Glagarharjo hamlets; OCHA Report 14, 15/06/06).  
 
After the 14 June flows, the evacuation areas were redefined to include areas within a radius 
of 8 km from the crater, and within 300 metres on either side of the Krasak, Bebeng, Bedog, 
Boyong and Gendol rivers (S. Bronto, pers. comm.).  The Indonesian government agency 
controlling the evacuation (SATLAK PB) reported that 531 people were evacuated in 
Magelang, 4,559 people in Sleman and nearly 4,000 people in Klaten. No-one was 
evacuated in Boyolali District but four sub-districts (Selo, Musuk, Cepogo and Ampel, with a 
total population of 57,000) were affected by the ash fall and sulphuric fumes (OCHA Report 
15, 22/06/06).   
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The premature lowering of the alert level on 13 June caused significant confusion and 
mistrust to develop between people living in at-risk locations, and the BPPTK. This lowering 
of the alert level and provision of trucks to transport farmers home implied authorities 
believed it was safe for people to return home, although they were told to remain on alert.  
Several farmers interview from the Kaliadem region said they did not trust the government 
anymore following the 14 June collapse event.  Scientists from the BPPTK were aware of this 
mistrust and the negative effect it may have on future warnings and advice.   
 
7.2.5 Phase 5: final return 
Throughout our field visit to the Merapi region (22 June – 5 July 2006), most evacuation 
camps appeared to be progressively emptying. On 22 June, the evacuation centre in 
Magelang was empty, though roughly 3,760 people remained at sites in Sleman and another 
2,455 people at sites in Klaten (OCHA Report 15, 22/06/06). There were still a large number 
of people travelling back and forth from the camps to their farms on a daily basis. By 10 July, 
the alert level was lowered to Level 1, apart from a 6 km exclusion zone on the southern 
slope. By late July the International Red Cross reported most evacuees had returned home.  
 
7.3 Evacuation camps 
7.3.1 Overview of the camps 
At the evacuation camps (Figure 31), evacuees were provided with three meals a day, 
access to clean water, emergency health services, and shelter (usually in the form of a tent).  
Our inspection of three camps in the Klaten district showed them to be well-managed, clean 
and tidy. There was no sign of reported hygiene problems, as reported by the Red Cross 
(Red Cross website). Camps were well-advertised with large signs above them and on roads 
leading to them. However, evacuees spoken to by our team reported high levels of boredom, 
but also stressed and anxious about the uncertainty for their livelihoods the eruption had 
created.  Many were fearful of the impact the eruption was having on their crops and 
livestock.  With many homes evacuated, there was also a fear of looting occurring in the 
evacuation zone. 
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Figure 32 Talking to evacuees at the Kaliadem evacuation shelter 
 
7.3.2 Movement between evacuation camps and farms 
A key aspect of the evacuation was the movement of many evacuees back to farms in the 
exclusion zone during the day to tend farms and check homes. They would then return at 
night to evacuation camps. An evacuation camp in Klaten close to Merapi Golf Course held 
approximately 50 to 60 people during the day, but occupants said it swelled dramatically at 
night.  One farmer in Petung told of his fears of Merapi erupting again, especially at night; 
however he was extremely concerned about looters so would return daily to look after his 
farm and repair his home, damaged by the 14 June flows. Typically it was males and young 
women who would return to the zone. During our three visits to evacuation camps no males 
above the age of 15 were observed, and the camp population mostly comprised elderly 
women, young mothers and children. 
 
7.4 Exclusion control 
The Indonesian government initially allocated approximately Rp 20 billion ($US 2.3 million) to 
fund the evacuation in May, which subsequently increased following the 27 May earthquake 
(WHO Emergency Situation Report 9, 15/6/06). Roadblocks were set up below the 
evacuated towns and villages to create an exclusion zone. Evacuation routes were well-
marked (Figure 33). Road closures were marked with a standard circular symbol with a red 
band through centre (Figure 34). This signage was consistently used in all areas visited by 
the field team. Bamboo barriers (Figure 34) were also used in places, particularly during the 
initial phase of our field visit.  
 
Initially this zone was closed to all but emergency authorities and journalists. However, over 
the course of our visit, we observed changes in the control of traffic into the exclusion zone. 
In the last week of June, we observed highly organised road closure checkpoints, staffed by 
up to six people equipped with fluorescent vests, masks and radios (Figure 34). This was 
true of most roads leading into the exclusion zone around all sectors of the volcano. By the 
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first week of July there appeared to be much less control over entry into the exclusion zone, 
and we were able to drive in past unattended checkpoints (for instance, past the Kaliadem 
checkpoint shown in Figure 34, which was unattended by the first week of July).  While we do 
not want to speculate on official policy, this apparent reluctance to enforce the exclusion 
zone may have been a strategy to limit the economic losses to farmers. 
 
7.5 The social landscape and factors influencing risk perceptions and 
evacuation behaviour 
7.5.1 Economic pressures 
The tendency for people to stay in evacuation camps overnight and return to their farms was 
mentioned previously in Section 7.3.2. The main reasons for this are believed to be both 
economic and cultural. Economic factors were previously mentioned in the discussion of 
impacts on the eruption on local farms (Section 5). Subsistence farmers were very reluctant 
to leave their farms which are in general their only source of financial security, and our team 
spoke to several farmers who considered themselves unable to absorb any financial losses. 
There also appeared to be a collective belief that the government would be unlikely to 
provide any compensation for crop losses, particularly as the 27 May earthquake also 
imposed high demands on relief funds.  
 
7.5.2 The role of traditional beliefs 
Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, with 86% of Indonesians 
declaring themselves Muslim in the 2000 Census. In Java, as in other parts of Indonesia, 
Islam has reportedly blended with other belief systems. In particular, the influence of 
Hinduism and classical India beliefs are defining traits in Indonesian culture, and the Indian 
concept of the god-king shapes Indonesian concepts of leadership. While Indonesian 
Muslims are typically devout, local customs and beliefs are generally favoured over Islamic 
law, so that, for instance, there are greater levels of freedom and social status for women 
compared to countries adhering to Sharia law more closely. Javanese Muslims reportedly 
occupy a broad continuum between abangan (a form of Islam influenced by pre-Islamic 
animistic and Hindu concepts) and santri (a more orthodox form of Islam). 
 
Pre-Islamic Javanese traditions have encouraged Islam in a mystical direction, and 
supernatural beliefs abound for many phenomena, including volcanism. While language 
barriers may have prevented us from fully understanding the range of traditional beliefs about 
Merapi, our conversations with local people suggested the following picture.  
 
Communities living in the Merapi region believe there is a spiritual link between the volcano 
and the Indian Ocean to the south. The increased activity of the volcano following the 27 May 
earthquake, centred around 25 km SSW of Yogyakarta, served to strengthen perceptions of 
this belief for many people. Another important belief is that there is a spiritual kingdom at the 
mountain’s summit and that an eruption is a ‘party’ of the mountain king, or an expression of 
his displeasure at receiving insufficient offerings, or perhaps more generally at the disrespect 
shown by people living on the slopes of the mountain. Another version of this belief was that 
the eruption was a punishment or warning that people had become too worldly and 
materialistic (Taipei Times, 30/05/06).  
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Figure 33 Evacuation route sign just below Kaliadem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 Staff manning the roadblock below Kaliadem, 22 June 2006 
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These beliefs were carried through into actions. We heard of ceremonies being held, usually 
organised by community elders or leaders, to ask the mountain king for mercy and to make 
offerings such as burying coins. 
 
A further element of the belief system concerned the existence of omens. On the western 
and southern sides of the mountain in particular, we encountered the belief that the mountain 
would only erupt after certain omens or portents, some of which may appear in dreams. A 
commonly-mentioned omen was the sight of animals, particularly white animals, moving 
downhill.  
 
The belief in omens in particular is an obvious source of conflict between traditional beliefs, 
and messages from emergency management authorities. While in general evacuations 
during the 2006 eruptions of Merapi were regarded as effective and efficient, there were 
instances where conflicts arose when local residents were reluctant to evacuate because 
they had not observed any omens and did not believe official warnings.  
 
An important character in the social landscape of Merapi is Mbah Marijan, the ceremonial 
guardian of the volcano appointed by the Sultan Hamengkubuwono X of Yogyakarta. The 
guardian’s role is to be Merapi’s safe keeper, and Marijan oversees ceremonies and offerings 
to the volcano intended to placate the mountain king. During the 2006 eruptions of Merapi, 
Marijan did not see any signs of an impending eruption and encouraged villagers to remain in 
their homes (Red Cross, 16 May; Dr. S. Bronto, pers comm.).  
 
Marijan is regarded by local people as ‘understanding the volcano’, and is also considered an 
unofficial leader for his local community (the villages of Kinahrejo and Umbulharjo) and more 
generally for the Sleman subdistrict. His influence led many people to decide not to evacuate 
despite recommendations from the authorities to do so. Confusion created by the premature 
lowering of the alert level and decision to allow people to return home prior to the major 
block-and-ash flows of 14 June is likely to have increased the level of distrust in the BPPTK 
and the emergency management authorities in general, and led to people putting more faith 
in the predictions of Mbah Marijan.  
 
These traditional beliefs are well-understood by local academic staff and government 
volcanologists.  However there appeared to be a reluctance to explain how they address 
such issues when a direct conflict occurs, such as that descrived with Mbah Marijan.  A 
pragmatic approach is evident in this quote from President Yudhoyono: 
 
I understand that in Yogyakarta there are still traditional beliefs among people. We 
respect these beliefs, but when it comes to saving people, we have to do our job well. 
(Red Cross, 16 May). 
 
7.5.3 The role of a stratified community in facilitating evacuations 
The stratified social structure and clearly-defined leadership of the communities around 
Merapi was an essential part of the efficiency of the evacuations. Information was able to be 
quickly distributed by the head of the village or village elders. These leaders were also able 
to mobilise the whole village for full evacuation if necessary. This approach ensured that few 
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were left behind, and in general highlighted the benefits of a unified and cohesive community 
during an emergency such as an evacuation.  
 
7.5.4 Individual risk perceptions and preparedness 
Local residents interviewed by the team showed a very high level of awareness of Merapi’s 
volcanic hazards, and also a high level of awareness of what to do during an eruption. Nearly 
all the twelve people we interviewed within 15 kilometres of the volcano had established an 
evacuation plan, either as part of their village evacuation plan or an individual family plan. 
These plans included meeting points for family members if they were separated.  
 
Most Indonesians we met, even those with university-level education, expressed reluctance 
to use paper maps for direction-finding or relating directions to us. However, perhaps in 
compensation, most also had very well-developed mental maps of their surroundings.  This is 
likely to have important implications for local hazard education initiatives.  
 
The overall high levels of hazard awareness and strategies for coping with an eruption are 
not surprising considering that most local residents have lived in the region for their entire 
lives and are likely to have experienced multiple eruptions. However, there can be dangers in 
over-familiarity. For example, many evacuees we spoke to stated that that they ‘knew’ Merapi 
as they had lived in the region for their whole lives. Local newspapers had reports of people 
believing Merapi would ‘spare them’ (Jakarta Post, 10/06/06). We found a commonly-held 
expectation among upland farmers that Merapi would eventually stop erupting as it had done 
in the past. The extrapolation from experiences in the recent past may contribute to the 
perception that the volcano is likely to produce small, low-explosivity eruptions in the future, a 
perception that is regarded by some scientists as being dangerously inaccurate (see Section 
3.3).  
 
7.5.5 Risk communication 
Risk communication appeared to have been consistent for the most part, with the media 
usually presenting accurate information from the BPPTK. The Indonesian president delivered 
the same message to evacuation camps, asking people to stay calm and remain in the 
evacuation camps until the eruption was over. Nearly all people we spoke to had a good 
awareness of current hazard information, although it appears economic concerns caused 
many people to accept a greater degree of risk by returning to the evacuation zone.   
 
A range of risk communication initiatives had been undertaken on the western and southern 
flanks as recently as 2005. Many villages also had hazard maps and evacuation details on 
posted boards at key points in the village.  
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8. OTHER HAZARDS AT MERAPI 
8.1 Lahars 
The Indonesian word lahar means ‘volcanic mudflow’. Lahars have occurred frequently at 
Merapi in the past. Lahars can occur as an immediate consequence of explosive eruptions, 
or for some time afterwards. This is because unconsolidated volcaniclastic debris deposited 
on the upper slopes of the volcano can be mobilised by heavy rainfall (for instance, when the 
monsoon season begins in September), sending lahars down the drainage system. Lahars 
can cause damage much further afield than areas affected by pyroclastic flows, and can 
threaten villages that may consider themselves safely removed from the hazard zone for 
Merapi.  
 
Lahars are a considerable problem from a management point of view because they can 
occur when the mountain is not erupting. Despite the small size of the 2006 eruptions of 
Merapi, a significant lahar hazard now exists as a result of the eruptive products deposited 
on the western and southern slopes. Lavigne et al. (2000) noted that the lahar-prone 
drainage systems on the south flank of Merapi support a high population density and vital 
resources for the region.  
 
Several mitigation measures have been put in place to lessen the impact of lahars at Merapi. 
These include Sabo dams, which cull large clasts from lahar flows (Figure 35), and check 
dams, or lateral stop-banks, which confine lahar flows within channels (Figure 36). 
Unfortunately these dams are all located on the west and southwest flanks of Merapi. The 
south side, which is now vulnerable to pyroclastic flows and lahars following the collapse of 
the Geger Boyo, is currently unprotected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35 Sabo dam in Indonesia 
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Figure 36 Check dam on Merapi south flank river 
 
 
8.2 Sector collapse 
The threat of a sector collapse at Merapi is substantiated by deposits suggesting that a 
similar event may have taken place in the past (Newhall et al., 2000). The hills immediately 
above the popular tourist destination of Kaliurang are interpreted as slump blocks that are 
remnants of sector collapse of prehistoric Merapi (Newhall et al., 2000). A sector collapse 
would likely be catastrophic, putting tens or perhaps even hundreds of thousands of lives at 
risk.  
 
8.3 Future eruptions at Merapi 
Merapi is one of the most active volcanoes in the world (Witham, 2005) and the threat of 
small eruptions is constant. As covered in Chapter 2, effusive eruptions from Merapi are 
frequent and can last for decades. In particular, eruptions involving lava dome growth 
generate hazards in the form of dome collapses causing block and ash flows and tephra fall. 
Larger explosive eruptions (VEI 3+) have longer return periods, but are much greater 
hazards and would threaten much larger areas.  
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9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Impacts on agriculture 
The agricultural sector was very vulnerable to the impacts of the 2006 Merapi eruption, 
although this vulnerability was not uniform across the sector and indeed in some instances a 
high degree of resilience was observed on many farms (such as those with rice crops).  The 
sector received the most damage of any economic sector, mostly due to the close proximity 
of a significant number of farms to Merapi. Impacts varied with ash thickness, as well as by 
crop type and plant maturity. Up to 100% of crops were lost in some locations. Significant 
weight loss in cows was observed due to animals eating tephra-covered fodder.  Access to a 
reliable water supply appeared to be a key factor in overall farm resilience, although a 
diverse selection of crops grown on each farm also increased resilience. 
 
Tropical agricultural systems are thought to have quite a high degree of resilience due to the 
favourable climate and fertile soils allowing a year-round growing season. It also appears that 
farmers in the Merapi region have adapted their farming practices to build in more resilience 
by having a diverse range of cash crops in addition to the staple rice crop. However, 
individual farmers generally considered themselves unable to absorb financial losses such as 
the loss of one crop rotation. This economic pressure probably led to the adoption of risky 
behaviour during the eruption, with farmers staying in evacuation camps overnight but 
returning to the exclusion zone by day to tend their farms.   
 
9.2 Impacts on infrastructure 
Impacts on the local infrastructure of the Merapi region from the 2006 eruption varied with 
location and hazard. Generally, the infrastructure showed considerable resilience to tephra 
falls. Tephra thicknesses less than 0.5 mm did not cause any damage other than nuisance 
value. Tephra thicknesses up to several centimetres did not produce any reported damage to 
buildings, utilities, vehicles, or telecommunications equipment.  
 
Areas in the path of pyroclastic flows were completely destroyed, but the damage dwindled to 
background levels within several metres of the flow boundaries.  
 
The degree of resilience observed was higher than that expected, based on other models for 
ash impacts (Spence et al., 2005; Baxter et al. 2005). However, there may be a delayed 
lahar hazard as a result of the 14 June 2006 block and ash flows, which deposited 
unconsolidated debris on the upper slopes of the south side of Merapi. Any lahars generated 
may cause further impacts on infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, downstream.  
 
9.3 Social impacts of the 2006 eruptions  
Two people lost their lives in the 2006 eruptions of Merapi. They were sheltering in an 
emergency bunker designed to provide protection from pyroclastic flows, but this structure 
was overwhelmed by the 3 p.m. pyroclastic flow on 14 June. This failure should prompt a 
review of the construction of these bunkers. Part of Kaliadem village was destroyed by this 
event. 
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Large-scale evacuation of people living in high-risk villages on the slopes of Merapi was 
carried out, and is generally thought to have been an effective response to the eruptions, 
efficiently carried out. During the first phase of the evacuations, some 20,000 people were 
housed in evacuation camps, which were generally well-resourced and well-managed. 
However, the disruption, stress of abandoning farms, and uncertainty took their toll on many 
people we spoke to. Other problems with the evacuation are discussed further in Section 9.4.  
 
9.4 An emergency management framework 
Considering the ‘4Rs’ of emergency management, the response to the 2006 eruptions of 
Merapi have been covered at length in this report and summarised briefly above. Our field 
visit was made during the latter stages of the eruption, and we can only comment to a limited 
extent on recovery in this region. As far as the other two components of reduction and 
readiness are concerned we can offer the following observations. 
 
Risk reduction is a difficult prospect in the Merapi region. The volcano is one of the most 
active in the world. During the 20th century, eruptions of Merapi caused 1600 deaths, and 
tens of thousands more were injured, evacuated or made homeless. The impacts of 
eruptions have become increasingly more devastating because of the rapidly-growing 
population. An estimated 1.1 million people live on the slopes of Merapi, and the population 
growth rate was calculated as 3% annually in the mid-1990s. Java has one of the highest 
population densities in the world, imposing significant stress on its natural resources and 
leading to marginal and dangerous regions (such as the slopes of Merapi) being inhabited. 
Approximately 440,000 people live in high-risk areas subject to pyroclastic flows, surges and 
lahars from Merapi. The situation is exacerbated by the general lack of land-use planning. In 
summary, all available information points towards an increasing volcanic risk in the Merapi 
region.  
 
Fortunately, risk readiness among vulnerable communities in the Merapi region was found to 
be very good. At an individual level, people had a good understanding of volcanic hazards, 
and were well-prepared for evacuations. Nearly all the people we spoke with had established 
an evacuation plan, either as part of their village evacuation plan or as an individual family 
plan. These plans included meeting points for family members if they were separated. When 
evacuations occurred, they were carried out efficiently. As an example, around 15,000 
people were evacuated from Kaliadem village after the first block and ash flow at noon on 14 
June, within a three-hour timeframe. The well-established social structure and clearly-defined 
leadership roles in rural communities were undoubtedly important in facilitating evacuations.   
 
However, there are some problem areas. Economic pressures caused farmers to return to 
their farms in the exclusion zone during the daytime, and may also have caused other 
residents to refuse to evacuate altogether. The fact that supernatural beliefs about the 
volcano hold sway in this region may also contribute to this trend; people may put more faith 
in traditional beliefs (such as omens of an impending eruption) rather than scientifically-
based warnings. The emergency management authorities may have also suffered setbacks 
to their credibility by lowering the alert level in advance of a major eruptive event (14 June 
block and ash flows); people returned to their homes but then had to be re-evacuated. The 
continuing uncertainty was a difficult situation for both the authorities and the local residents.  
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9.5 Lessons for New Zealand 
9.5.1 Agriculture 
During our field visit, we collected data on crop damage in relation to tephra thickness, crop 
type and maturity.  It is apparent that some types of crop are highly susceptible to ash fall 
hazards and will likely suffer severe loss or abandonment of the crop, even from thin ash 
falls.  The large range of crops and impacts to crops and livestock observed will provide a 
useful basis for predicting impacts of an eruption in New Zealand on the horticultural sector.  
The information will also be used in fragility functions for the Riskscape model.  
 
An important lesson for New Zealand is that during an eruption it is likely large areas of 
agricultural land will be evacuated, even if not impacted, due to the uncertainty of volcanic 
eruptions.  The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Regional Councils and other authorities likely to be involved in the response to 
a volcanic eruption should be aware that farmers will be reluctant to evacuate their lands, 
and will want to return once evacuated to check on their farm whether it has been impacted 
by hazards or not.    
 
9.5.2 Infrastructure 
Observations made at Merapi during the 2006 eruptions suggest that existing models of 
infrastructure impacts due to tephra fall may be inaccurate, with damage to infrastructure 
generally less than expected. Our findings will be used to refine these models to include, for 
example, the presence of absence of rainfall.  
 
A lesson from our observations of pyroclastic flow damage was that modelling needs to take 
into account the physical characteristics of the erupted material. At Merapi, the block-and-ash 
flow material was highly degassed, and the resulting pattern of damage had very sharp 
margins as a result of the cohesiveness of the flow. However, differing flow characteristics 
are likely to generate different patterns of damage.  
 
9.5.3 Social impacts 
The evacuation systems and procedures, together with education initiatives increasing 
individual awareness of hazards, are clearly well-organised at Merapi and should provide 
some useful lessons for New Zealand.  
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10. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
The following suggestions for future projects build on the findings of this report: 
 
- Detailed studies of damaged houses in Kaliadem / Bebeng village to determine the 
damage in relation to the building construction; 
- Discussion with the national authorities in Jakarta on the final economic impacts of the 
2006 eruption; 
- Discussion with public health and disaster relief agencies (such as the Red Cross/ Red 
Crescent in Yogyakarta) of the final numbers of people affected by the 2006 eruption; 
- Analysis of the recovery dynamics of agricultural systems, including aspects such as 
changes in soil fertility and production yields of crops; 
- Investigation of lahar hazards as a result of the 2006 eruption; 
- A social science project looking at where villagers get their information from, who they 
trust, levels of knowledge and preparedness, general world views and so on; 
- At the onset of further activity from Merapi, a return to the volcano would provide an 
opportunity to collect information on impacts in order to compare them to the 2006 
eruption. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1 Field stops around Merapi, 22 June – 5 July 2006  
ID ALT LAT LONG ASH STOP_NUM NOTES 
2 486.8 -7.667116 110.432070 0.1  trace to less than 1 mm 
3 480.3 -7.667157 110.432107 0.0   
4 478.9 -7.667152 110.432100 0.0   
5 677.6 -7.624893 110.447960 0.0   
6 916.5 -7.600205 110.453837 0.0   
7 1029.9 -7.589340 110.445404 0.0  Opak River below Kaliadem 
8 989.3 -7.588996 110.445601 0.0   
9 1004.0 -7.589021 110.445550 0.0   
10 1004.5 -7.589082 110.445531 0.0   
11 1004.9 -7.661272 110.466841 0.5 1.90 flow not here, less than 0.5 mm ash 
12 430.6 -7.662139 110.488987 0.0  evac centre? 
13 402.0 -7.666142 110.504014 1.0 1.10 buried temple - beside woro river 
14 400.0 -7.666258 110.506790 0.1 1.11 sand mining, trace ash 
15 400.0 -7.623153 110.549022 0.1 1.12 trace 
16 464.0 -7.505895 110.499983 3.0 1.13  
17 1382.3 -7.505434 110.482974 2.0 1.14 Up Selo Pass 
18 1366.1 -7.497389 110.424226 3.0 1.16  
19 1168.8 -7.496228 110.411126 4.0   
20 149.4 -7.783062 110.445544 0.0   
21 247.2 -7.728737 110.422602 0.0  Sutikno's House 
22 303.2 -7.701582 110.414584 0.0  No ash 
23 305.1 -7.660238 110.402960 0.1 4.10 trace 
24 461.1 -7.651302 110.396709 0.1 4.20 trace 
25 434.4 -7.649399 110.367230 0.0 4.30 evac centre (same as stop number 1.5) 
26 433.9 -7.654893 110.359899 0.5 4.40 <0.5 mm 
27 433.0 -7.644662 110.333889 0.1 4.50 trace 
28 427.9 -7.646292 110.324267 2.0 4.60  
29 392.1 -7.628284 110.321386 0.0 4.70  
30 398.1 -7.613477 110.306780 0.0   
31 386.8 -7.593300 110.293038 0.1 4.80 trace 
32 381.8 -7.578713 110.292615 1.0 4.90 stopped to film 
33 491.8 -7.555095 110.314184 1.5 4.10  
34 610.3 -7.540021 110.335247 1.5 4.11  
35 637.0 -7.537097 110.342801 2.0 4.12  
36 640.6 -7.526184 110.358369 2.0 4.14  
37 949.9 -7.516535 110.384042 3.0 4.15  
38 1046.5 -7.517148 110.392231 5.0 4.17 conv. With farmer 
39 1072.2 -7.517091 110.394595 20.0 4.18 mosque 
40 1248.6 -7.512649 110.413955 0.0   
41 1302.0 -7.514438 110.416874 15.0 4.19  
42 1322.9 -7.514284 110.416837 0.0   
43 1320.0 -7.514238 110.416840 0.0   
44 1321.0 -7.513865 110.417188 0.0   
45 1319.3 -7.513563 110.417628 0.0   
46 1319.5 -7.513604 110.417730 0.0   
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47 1320.5 -7.513813 110.417327 0.0   
48 1320.5 -7.514240 110.416807 0.0   
49 1321.2 -7.515405 110.417976 20.0 4.23  
50 117.6 -7.794861 110.457885 0.0 5.00  
51 114.3 -7.806159 110.454497 0.0   
52 123.2 -7.807637 110.456649 0.0   
53 100.3 -7.808277 110.459428 0.1 5.10 Opak River Bridge (pillow lavas), trace 
54 104.4 -7.809532 110.461993 0.0  Blue EQ tents 
55 122.7 -7.807060 110.482921 0.0  Road - TW Vidoe damage 
56 133.7 -7.781793 110.484923 0.0 5.20  
57 164.8 -7.764278 110.488881 0.0 5.30  
58 187.8 -7.735908 110.488573 0.0  Road above highway 
59 187.1 -7.712768 110.503436 0.0 5.40  
60 288.0 -7.695559 110.493289 0.0 5.50 Road 
61 286.8 -7.696812 110.501251 0.0 5.60  
62 317.1 -7.674177 110.519136 0.1 5.70 Trace to <1 mm 
63 334.4 -7.670395 110.520037 0.1 5.80 trace, talked to farmer with 72 ducks 
64 369.0 -7.661629 110.517156 0.8 5.90 0.5 to 1 mm 
65 441.6 -7.644227 110.510346 1.0 5.10  
66 448.6 -7.640216 110.508670 1.0 5.11 evac camp 
67 590.9 -7.624061 110.499856 0.1 5.12 trace 
68 594.9 -7.619163 110.495488 0.1 5.13 trace 
69 598.5 -7.606772 110.488953 1.0 5.14  
70 874.0 -7.595085 110.479720 2.0 5.15 road block 
71 880.7 -7.593128 110.476787 0.0   
72 1001.8 -7.589301 110.472964 0.0   
73 1020.3 -7.587984 110.472334 4.0 5.16  
74 1086.4 -7.583661 110.469887 5.0 5.17 Photo 2243 
75 1138.1 -7.579820 110.469222 10.0 5.18  
76 1036.4 -7.582343 110.476833 0.0 5.19  
77 1029.2 -7.581965 110.477086 0.0  
Ash is very thick here - about as thick as we've seen,  
rain crust on ashy roofs 
78 1032.6 -7.581913 110.477099 15.0   
79 1046.5 -7.581532 110.476297 0.0  Vegetable Patch 
80 1235.2 -7.575753 110.468136 35.0  Cows, taped them eating 
81 190.7 -7.710330 110.420149 0.1 6.20 Sri's House, trace 
82 440.9 -7.660881 110.407144 0.0   
83 442.1 -7.655215 110.396121 0.1  trace 
84 400.8 -7.652070 110.360838 2.0   
85 394.0 -7.635182 110.330809 0.1  trace 
86 489.7 -7.613010 110.344931 2.0 6.30  
87 534.1 -7.606254 110.354826 0.0   
88 541.8 -7.604936 110.356644 0.0   
89 549.5 -7.603622 110.357987 0.0 6.40  
90 551.0 -7.603687 110.360863 0.1 6.50 trace 
91 613.7 -7.600196 110.361276 0.0   
92 613.0 -7.595532 110.368077 0.1 6.60 trace to 1mm 
93 703.8 -7.589610 110.375501 1.0 6.70  
94 702.6 -7.588804 110.376401 2.5 6.80  
95 709.3 -7.586846 110.377740 0.0   
96 726.6 -7.584569 110.380481 3.0 6.90 Chili Peppers 
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97 499.3 -7.610122 110.346174 0.0   
98 504.1 -7.607041 110.342496 0.0   
99 488.0 -7.597096 110.332980 1.0 6.10  
100 491.4 -7.600944 110.322967 1.0 6.11  
101 371.0 -7.593098 110.292844 0.0   
102 368.8 -7.558353 110.311453 0.1  trace 
103 377.7 -7.555560 110.314014 1.0   
104 604.1 -7.540153 110.337199 0.0  river 
105 663.9 -7.528322 110.347335 8.0   
106 849.7 -7.509086 110.363110 15.0 6.12 Selo Road (different than when we came down?), Tobacco 
107 1071.3 -7.498309 110.378354 12.0 6.13  
108 1092.4 -7.499714 110.389860 8.0 6.14 Wonolelo 
109 1091.9 -7.499668 110.389918 0.0  Wonolelo 
110 1098.9 -7.499412 110.390122 6.0 6.15  
111 1098.9 -7.499412 110.390122 5.0 6.16  
112 1255.1 -7.497857 110.419135 4.0 6.17  
113 1418.1 -7.499119 110.436701 3.0 6.19  
114 1580.5 -7.501473 110.459345 0.0 0.00  
115 1737.5 -7.512834 110.453495 2.0 6.20  
116 1721.6 -7.515635 110.452555 5.0 6.21 Said there was 50mm up the slope (1km from summit) 
117 758.1 -7.518674 110.358698 0.0 6.22 15 mm since may 
118 766.1 -7.805921 110.447454 0.0   
119 118.6 -7.812281 110.466446 0.0   
120 114.5 -7.814974 110.480772 0.0   
121 116.0 -7.810124 110.483531 0.0   
122 126.5 -7.811631 110.486516 0.0   
123 119.3 -7.811988 110.488719 0.0 9.20 House being demolished by airforce 
124 116.4 -7.812624 110.511572 0.0  Heavy EQ Damage 
125 214.7 -7.817855 110.518339 0.0 9.30  
126 216.2 -7.818094 110.518259 0.0  Stream Bed 
127 209.9 -7.817878 110.519926 0.0  Weird volccaniclastic 
128 206.3 -7.817898 110.519671 0.0   
129 103.9 -7.837346 110.474208 0.0   
130 106.1 -7.837390 110.471860 0.0   
131 101.3 -7.842040 110.470323 0.0   
132 99.9 -7.848897 110.464875 0.0   
133 113.8 -7.849689 110.457359 0.0   
134 219.1 -7.852829 110.453709 0.0   
135 261.6 -7.854697 110.453800 0.0   
136 263.8 -7.858413 110.453768 0.0   
137 251.0 -7.862898 110.457337 0.0   
138 232.3 -7.867117 110.454876 0.0   
139 229.4 -7.872318 110.449933 0.0   
140 228.7 -7.874139 110.448536 0.0   
141 215.5 -7.881813 110.440098 0.0   
142 105.1 -7.883186 110.438824 0.0   
143 113.3 -7.882901 110.432842 0.0   
144 72.7 -7.883008 110.432801 0.0  Hill we climbed down to get sample 
145 60.7 -7.827738 110.443223 0.0  Lunch 
146 339.0 -7.569572 110.259657 0.0   
147 338.7 -7.570709 110.256160 0.1 10.10 trace 
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148 338.7 -7.572871 110.254402 0.1  trace 
149 338.7 -7.577308 110.250753 0.1  trace 
150 326.5 -7.587574 110.242163 0.0   
151 278.4 -7.591523 110.238421 0.0   
152 274.6 -7.596697 110.234886 0.0   
153 261.4 -7.604883 110.230057 0.5 10.20  
154 263.0 -7.602850 110.225164 0.0   
155 260.4 -7.602128 110.222254 0.0   
156 258.7 -7.605010 110.219041 0.0   
157 258.7 -7.605784 110.209534 0.1  trace 
158 267.4 -7.605984 110.208888 0.0   
159 267.4 -7.605984 110.208888 0.0   
160 263.3 -7.603198 110.215544 0.1 10.30 trace 
161 142.9 -7.782264 110.387887 0.0   
162 140.0 -7.783051 110.384441 0.0   
163 138.1 -7.783026 110.382136 0.0   
164 100.1 -7.788942 110.370456 0.0   
165 107.8 -7.790581 110.368577 0.0   
166 128.9 -7.790158 110.366724 0.0   
167 140.0 -7.792727 110.366402 0.0   
168 140.7 -7.804480 110.363379 0.0   
169 121.5 -7.801679 110.364676 0.0   
170 124.6 -7.801493 110.368071 0.0   
171 134.0 -7.801816 110.375887 0.0   
172 134.0 -7.801816 110.375887 0.0   
173 127.3 -7.798198 110.384837 0.0   
174 130.9 -7.802874 110.378272 0.0   
175 130.6 -7.811420 110.376696 0.0   
176 112.1 -7.815578 110.376179 0.0   
177 114.0 -7.816215 110.375884 0.0   
178 113.8 -7.815261 110.372545 0.0   
179 109.7 -7.818541 110.368168 0.0   
180 109.2 -7.821947 110.367843 0.0   
181 106.4 -7.824285 110.367600 0.0   
182 97.7 -7.827564 110.367527 0.0   
183 102.0 -7.833420 110.366812 0.0   
184 95.1 -7.834379 110.385006 0.0   
185 513.7 -7.644282 110.434040 0.0   
186 659.6 -7.625038 110.433679 0.0   
187 678.3 -7.624807 110.449483 0.0  Red Cross Water Station (?) 
188 687.5 -7.624495 110.453727 0.0   
189 675.7 -7.606937 110.453800 0.0   
190 1011.4 -7.591118 110.450767 0.0   
191 1016.7 -7.589501 110.450213 0.0   
192 1020.3 -7.586426 110.449162 0.0   
193 1021.3 -7.584580 110.448747 0.0   
194 1120.3 -7.582529 110.447512 0.0   
195 1119.6 -7.582957 110.448460 0.0   
196 1116.9 -7.582955 110.448457 0.0   
197 1092.9 -7.584802 110.448706 0.0   
198 675.2 -7.625081 110.429218 0.0   
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199 835.0 -7.598959 110.425553 3.0 13.10  
200 836.9 -7.592497 110.426234 0.0  road block 
201 609.4 -7.634183 110.425200 0.0   
202 444.3 -7.666763 110.418995 2.0   
203 441.1 -7.659648 110.397174 0.0   
204 451.9 -7.651591 110.396574 0.0   
205 600.0 -7.622150 110.404771 4.0   
206 787.7 -7.598908 110.414575 3.0   
207 903.5 -7.595376 110.415998 0.0  evac camp 
208 928.8 -7.589783 110.417097 3.0  road block 
209 982.6 -7.588463 110.421539 3.0   
210 986.4 -7.588411 110.424079 4.0  road block 
211 1006.4 -7.587958 110.424301 1.0  area destroyed by 1994 flows 
212 1022.7 -7.588269 110.424004 1.0  600mm of ash deposited in 1994 
213 890.3 -7.713088 110.386244 0.0   
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There has been limited published research on acid damage to vegetation from volcanic ash.  
It is well known ash falls can lead to elevated acidity and sulphur levels in soil (e.g. Cronin et 
al., 1998). These changes in soil composition can reduce the availability of phosphate and 
other essential minerals and alter soil characteristics to such an extent that arable crops and 
pasture plants will not survive (Cronin et al., 1998; 2003). There is less information on 
impacts on vegetation, although there have been several instances where acid rain or 
soluble ash-leachates following an eruption have caused detrimental effects to vegetation 
(Peterson and Tilling, 2000; Jacobson, 1984; Blong, 1984).   
 
Recent studies on the historical eruption of Laki volcano, in Iceland in 1783-84, have 
suggested that a ‘dry mist’, produced by the massive release of volcanic aerosols into the 
atmosphere during the eruption, may have caused impacts on soils and vegetation right 
across Western Europe (e.g. Grattan and Pyatt, 1994; Thordarson and Self, 1993). A wide 
range of critical plant processes were reported to have been affected by the volcanic mist, 
included photosynthesis, leaf formation, leaf reduction, fruiting, flowering and seeding. 
Observed impacts included premature yellowing of green leaves, trees prematurely losing 
leaves, and crops appearing weathered, shrivelled or dried despite abundant moisture, and 
with particular damage to leaf tips (Grattan and Pyatt, 1994). Despite damage to outer leaves 
and husks, the grains of cereal crops were reportedly unaffected, and some crops, such as 
rye, even appeared mildewed. Some plant varieties were relatively unaffected by the ‘dry 
fog’; these included wheat, mulberry bushes, fig trees and vines. Many of the above 
symptoms are considered typical acid damage (Grattan and Pyatt, 1994; Lang et al., 1980).   
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